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There is substantive literature that asserts clientelism to be a major cause of low 
levels of teacher accountability in India. The political class gives particularistic 
benefits to teachers and education officials in return for their electoral support. 
These benefits include favourable transfers and promotions or protection from 
scrutiny. As a result erring teachers proceed undisciplined or unpunished owing 
to the protection received. Teachers with the hope of obtaining favourable 
transfers and promotions, spend most of their time cultivating relations with 
politicians rather than actively teaching in the classrooms. The presence of a 
strong civil society is depicted in the literature as key to driving such clientelistic 
tendencies away from the system, thus ensuring teacher accountability.  
Paradoxically, after comparing two blocks in a district in the state of Karnataka, 
I ascertained that the block with greater civic action had lower levels of teacher 
accountability whereas the block without significant civic action had higher 
levels of teacher accountability. This despite the apparent practice of clientelism 
in both these blocks. As civic action could not systematically account for the 
varied performance of these two blocks, I searched for an alternative 
explanation to teacher accountability within the constraints of clientelism.  
Upon further investigation into each block, I found teacher accountability to be 
influenced by state capacity instead. The ability of the state in both these blocks 
to effectively ensure teacher accountability in the face of social opposition (i.e. 
politicians and teachers’ unions interested in maintaining the low levels of 
teacher accountability for personal and political gain), depended on the 
bureaucracy and its relationship with teachers and the political class.  
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In the block with higher levels of teacher accountability, the bureaucracy 
through strategies of consensus-building and reputation-building had developed 
a strong and engaging relationship with teachers and the political class. This 
provided the bureaucracy with significant operational latitude and support to 
ensure teacher accountability. The findings within this block revealed that 
clientelism, in the presence of an enlightened bureaucracy, did not affect teacher 
accountability significantly.  
In contrast, the block with low levels of teacher accountability had a highly 
politicised bureaucracy that functioned more in terms of advancing political or 
personal interests rather than quality education for all. Senior education officials 
were transferred out ever so quickly by political leadership attempting to exert 
their control over the system and officials at the lower rungs of the bureaucracy 
acted as nodal points in mobilising local support for the political class. All this 
was carried out despite the active and long standing presence of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in this block.  
The findings within this block thereby revealed that the presence of NGOs did 
not really help improve levels of teacher accountability. Instead, the nature of 
NGO involvement within the block appeared to have stifled bureaucratic 
initiative and produced a bureaucracy largely apathetic to working efficiently 
towards goals like teacher accountability. This left more room for powerful 
interest groups within society to capture and manipulate bureaucratic 
functioning for personal or political gain. The situation described above is in 
contrast to the popular understanding that vibrant NGO involvement will lead 
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The dismal performance of government-run primary schools in rural India 
has been well publicised1. Year after year, reports like the Annual Status of 
Education Report (ASER) depict the chronically low levels of learning amongst 
students in these schools2. In 2013, the percentage of children in government-
run schools who could read a Standard. 2 level text in Standard. 5 was 41.1 
percent. It has only recovered slightly to a paltry 42.2 percent in 2014 (ASER, 
2014, p. 19).  Much of the blame has been placed on government school 
teachers3.  
The issue of lack of teacher accountability has been highlighted by the media 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for over 20 years (Ramachandran, 
Pal, Jain, Shekar & Sharma, 2005). Their assertions are well supported by 
empirical studies that prove the average rate of teacher absenteeism to be still 
high across rural India, falling only modestly from 26.3 percent in 2003 to 23.6 
percent in 2010 (Muralidharan, Jishu, Holla & Mohpal, 2014, p.11). Even if 
teachers do show up in schools, field investigators on their unannounced visits 
                                                                                                                                                        
1The term government-run primary school refers to schools that are government-funded and 
government-run. This does not include the government-aided schools that are privately 
managed. A vast majority of children in rural India attend government-run schools. 
2 ASER is an annual report produced by the ASER Centre, a unit of the non-governmental 
organisation Pratham. The core of this report is based on a large scale survey that covers nearly 
all districts in rural India. The survey is an in-home assessment of the reading and arithmetic 
competencies of all children in the sampled villages, from ages 3 to 16. The ASER has been 
produced yearly since 2005. For more information and access to the annual reports visit 
http://www.asercentre.org/. Other reports that have collected similar information across select 
states in India and draw similar conclusions include PROBE Team (1999) and De, Khera, 
Samson & Kumar (2011).  
3 The PROBE Team (1999, p. 54) asserts, “If any single resource factor can make the difference 
between a poor school and a successful school, it is the commitment and initiative of the 
teacher.” There exists in the wider literature as well a broad consensus that teacher quality is the 
single most important school related variable influencing student learning (Darling-Hammond, 
2000& Rockoff, 2004). 
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observe the late arrival and early departure of many and a shocking lack of 
teaching (De, Khera, Samson & Kumar, 2011, pp. 35-36)4.  
There is substantive literature that asserts clientelism to be a major cause of 
low levels of teacher accountability in India5. The political class gives 
particularistic benefits to teachers in return for their electoral support. They are 
also known to harass and intimidate teachers with unfavourable transfers so as 
to ensure their on-going political support. 
In Rajasthan, for example, Sharma (2009, p. 162) observes how “transfers 
were regarded as ways of ‘obliging’ teachers who were close to powerful 
people, or doled out as a reward (or punishment, as the case may be) for services 
rendered such as assistance in political campaigns”. In Uttar Pradesh, 
Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav was issued a warning by the 
Election Commission of India for threatening school teachers, appointed on a 
contractual basis by the Uttar Pradesh Government, to either vote for his party 
in the Lok Sabha elections or risk losing their permanent status (“Threats to 
Contract Teachers”, 2014)6.  
Politicians have a strong incentive to engage with teachers. Being among 
the few educated and influential people in a village and often employed as 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 At the time of the PROBE Team’s (1999) unannounced visits, close to half the schools had no 
teaching activity. Most teachers were observed to be either absent, sipping tea, knitting or simply 
chatting. Another study, based on a random sample of more than 3000 schools across India, 
shares similar findings (Kremer, Chaudhury, Rogers, Muralidharan & Hammers, 2005). In this 
study, less than half of the teachers were engaged in any teaching activity on an average day. 
5 I derive the meaning of clientelism from Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) characterisation of 
a clientelistic relationship as one based on the contingent exchange of goods and/or services for 
political support (p. 2). For scholarly discussion on the prevalence of discretionary clientelistic 
transfers and promotions within the Indian education system and its implications see Wade 
1985; Ramachandran et al. (2005); Sharma (2009); Beteilli (2009); & Kingdon & Muzammil 
(2009, 2013).  
6 The Lok Sabha is the lower house of India's bicameral Parliament.  
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election officials, teachers are valued for their ability to mobilise the electoral 
support of villagers for the political class7. Teachers also have a strong incentive 
to cultivate relations with politicians, especially those who can gain for them 
favourable transfers and promotions. A favourable transfer or promotion would 
enable a teacher to work comfortably in an environment of his/her choice. Most 
teachers covet urban postings more than rural postings as they do not want the 
inconvenience of commuting or living in remote villages with poor facilities 
(PROBE Team, 1999, pp.60-61).  
As a result, teachers with the hope of obtaining favourable transfers and 
promotions, spend most of their time cultivating relations with politicians rather 
than actively teaching in the classrooms8. In addition, erring teachers proceed 
undisciplined or unpunished owing to the protection received from politicians 
and politically powerful teacher unions. In Uttar Pradesh, the knowledge that 
politically powerful unions are protecting them, encourages teachers to be lax 
in their behaviour towards school by being absent, arriving late and departing 
early (Kingdon & Muzammil, 2009)9. Politicians and political parties most often 
pander to the demands of these teacher unions as they are capable of collectively 
organising the largest group of government employees.  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 For a detail analysis on the dynamics behind the prevalent use of teachers for political 
campaigning in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Karnataka see Beteille (2009).  
8 See PROBE Team (1999); Ramachandran et al. (2005) & Betellie (2009) for more evidence 
of teachers spending a great deal of time and energy trying to avoid undesirable transfers by 
building up influential connections and lobbying for preferred postings. 
9 Furthermore, in Uttar Pradesh, teachers are guaranteed representation in the upper house of 
the state legislature. Such a provision has given teachers and their unions significant political 
clout. This has enabled them to dictate the governance of schooling on their own terms. This 
has resulted in increasing salaries and benefits for teachers, but less progress in improving the 
efficient functioning and quality of schools (Kingdon & Muzzamil, 2009). 
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The presence of a strong civil society is depicted in the literature as key to 
driving such clientelistic tendencies away from the system, thus ensuring 
teacher accountability. There exists in abundance, instances whereby NGOs, 
local-level mediators and social movements have effectively challenged the 
strong interests involved in perpetuating low levels of teacher accountability. 
One such example is the influential activist work of Mazdoor Kishan Shakti 
Sangathan (MKSS). Their role in organising Jan Sunwais (public hearings), 
demanding increased accountability and the scrutiny of school records has 
played a part in ensuring the efficient provision of public schooling in Rajasthan 
(Clarke & Jha, 2006).  
Paradoxically, I found after comparing two blocks in a district in the state 
of Karnataka, that the block with greater civic action, Heggadadevanakote (H.D. 
Kote), had lower levels of teacher accountability whereas the block without 
significant civic action, Krishnarajanagara (K.R. Nagara) had higher levels of 
teacher accountability10. Civic action, therefore, could not systematically 
account for the varied performance of these two blocks.    
In H.D. Kote, since 1980s, NGOs have contributed extensively to the 
block’s education system. Of all the NGOs, efforts undertaken by the Swami 
Vivekananda Youth Movement (SVYM) and the Mysore Resettlement and 
Development Agency (MYRADA) are the most prominent. In addition to 
helping schools construct compounds, procure toilets, waste disposal pits, 
computers and drinking water facilities, MYRADA and SVYM have made 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 In federal India, Indian states are further divided into districts. And districts have been further 
subdivided in blocks (administering several village clusters). And blocks further divided into 
clusters (administering several villages). Both blocks are from the same district Mysore.  
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significant efforts to strengthen School Monitoring Committees (SMCs) into 
effective accountability mechanisms11. Despite these efforts and the occurrence 
of several social movements within the block, teacher accountability remains 
low in H.D. Kote.   
In a state-wide standardized assessment conducted by the Karnataka State 
Quality Assessment and Accreditation Council (KSQAAC), an autonomous 
body of the State Government of Karnataka, H.D. Kote scored 53.64 percent on 
the learning environment of its government-run primary schools and 61.0 
percent on the leadership demonstrated in these schools12. In this evaluation, the 
conduct of teachers inside and outside the classroom is evaluated under both the 
criteria, learning environment and leadership. Therefore, the scores assigned to 
these criteria are most relevant in illustrating the level of teacher accountability 
within a block.  
To corroborate the KSQAAC assessment with actual observations from the 
field, I visited 3 schools (Schools 4, 5 and 6) from 3 different villages in H.D. 
Kote, each on two occasions.  In 2 out of the 3 schools visited, I found teachers 
arriving late and leaving early from school. In School 4 of H.D. Kote, 9 teachers 
and 1 Head Master had been officially deputed.  However, on my visits, I 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (“RTE”) 2009,  mandates that 
all government funded primary schools have a SMC comprising of parents of school going 
children, teachers and elected representatives of the local authority. It clearly specifies that at 
least 75 percent of SMC members be parents/ guardians of children enrolled in the school and 
that 50 percent of them be women. In addition, to ensure the fair representation of social groups 
within the village, traditionally marginalised and weaker segments of the community are to be 
represented in proportion to their population in the village. SMCs are to monitor teacher 
attendance and performance, prepare the school’s annual development plan and monitor the 
utilisation of funds for the development and maintenance of the school. 
12 The KSQAAC assesses and accredits government primary and secondary schools on the 
following criteria:  learning achievement of students, availability of basic facilities, quality of 
learning environment, conduct of innovative activities, leadership exhibited by Head Master and 
Teachers and strength of community participation. The KSQAAC 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 
results were obtained from the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET), Mysore.  
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observed that there were only 5 teachers and the Head Master present. The 
teachers present were not engaged in class. In School 5, I found only 7 teachers 
present. There was supposed to be 9 teachers there. Some of the teachers were 
observed arriving to the school late, others though present were not actively 
engaged in teaching (see Appendices 4, 5 and 6 for further elaboration on the 
level of teacher accountability in Schools 4, 5 and 6 of H.D. Kote).  
Compared to H.D. Kote, K.R. Nagara performed significantly better in the 
KSQAAC assessment - 76.73 and 78.75 percent on learning environment and 
leadership respectively. This despite the marked absence of social movements 
and the negligible involvement of NGOs within the block.  In the 3 schools I 
visited in K.R. Nagara (Schools 1, 2 and 3) all teachers were present and apart 
from the Head Master facilitating my visit, the rest of the teachers were actively 
engaged with the students (refer to Appendices 1, 2 and 3 for a detailed account 
of the level of teacher accountability in Schools 1, 2 and 3). Therefore, in both 
K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote, the presence (or absence) of civic action had not 
led to its expected outcomes.  
Besides, the practice of clientelism is apparent in both the wider political 
systems of H.D. Kote and K.R. Nagara.  In H.D. Kote, as particular parties and 
caste communities strive to gain greater control of the administration, positions 
within the local bureaucracy remain highly politicised and marked by great 
instability as officials are transferred in and out frequently. Likewise in K.R. 
Nagara, the political jockeying for votes by the block’s two dominant caste 
communities, has resulted in key positions within the local bureaucracy being 
given to members from either of the two communities. In addition, K.R. Nagara 
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has the highest number of poll code violations and political parties are known 
to actively bribe the voters of this block (Bennur, 2013 & Mohammed, 2013).  
If it is not civic action, what then accounts for K.R. Nagara’s better 
performance? This led me to seek an alternative explanation to teacher 
accountability within the constraints of clientelism. I used the framework for 
analysing developmental outcomes within the field of comparative politics as a 
guide to solving the puzzle set out above13. The field of comparative politics 
considers how development outcomes are influenced by processes that take 
place within and between society and the state. The framework allowed for the 
identification of gaps in the current understanding of how teacher accountability 
can be achieved in India.   
There are two approaches in the field of comparative politics. The first 
approach attributes developmental outcomes to processes emanating from 
society. Comparative scholars adhering to this approach demonstrate how 
effective governance is achieved through civic action. For example, Putnam 
(1993), observed that regional governments in Italy performed better (in terms 
of governance and development) in regions where social capital, namely norms, 
trusts and networks, improved the efficiency of the society by facilitating 
coordinated action (p.167). Likewise, the causal like between civic engagement 
and teacher accountability has been well established by the literature on India.    
Mythili’s (2002) study, for example, records teachers feeling a sense of 
pressure from the close attention parents pay in Shimoga, a district within 
Karnataka. Another example, mentioned earlier, is the influential activist work 
                                                                                                                                                        




of Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in organising Jan Sunwais 
(public hearings) to ensure the efficient provision of public schooling in 
Rajasthan (Clarke & Jha, 2006).  Krishna (2002), argues further that the success 
of civic engagement in ensuring better governance is dependent on the presence 
of local leadership. Krishna observes how local agents across Madhya Pradesh 
and Rajasthan, which he terms ‘Naya Netas’ (new leaders), enable close-knit 
village communities to participate more effectively in local governance. The 
Naya Netas raise the interests and concerns of these villagers to powerful 
individuals within the state. In bringing their voices closer to the state, these 
Naya Netas enable villagers to place greater pressure on the state and its 
agencies to deliver. In a subsequent study, Krishna (2011) finds that 64 percent 
of the villagers he interviewed turned to Naya Netas for assistance in getting 
non-performing teachers replaced. 
But as indicated above, civic action could not systematically account for the 
outcomes in both K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote.  Therefore, an explanation to 
K.R. Nagara’s success within the constraints of clientelism could probably be 
found within the second approach of comparative politics. The second approach 
attributes outcomes to factors driven by the state. These include the state’s 
organisational structure and the action of its functionaries. Trimberger (1978), 
for example, explains how bureaucrats in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru were 
able to reorient the economic development of their respective countries by 
seizing power from the dominant classes (i.e. landed, commercial, or industrial 
classes). However, the extent of economic change these bureaucrats were able 




The ability of a state to effectively implement its official goals in the face of 
social opposition is recognised conceptually as ‘state capacity’ (Skocpol, 1985, 
p.9). But as Trimberger (1978) points out, state capacity is only possible if the 
state possess a certain degree of autonomy from the influence of powerful 
societal forces. Therefore, scholars adhering to the second approach 
demonstrate the processes through which states insulate themselves so as to 
effectively pursue developmental goals. 
 In Trimberger’s (1978) case the reason for state autonomy is social 
structure. The bureaucracy can be said to be autonomous when the officials 
holding high posts satisfy two conditions. Firstly, ‘they are not recruited from 
dominant landed, commercial, or industrial classes’. Secondly, ‘they do not 
form close personal and economic ties with these classes after their elevation to 
high office’ (p. 17).   
Others like Stepan (1978) demonstrate how prior socialisation instilled in 
state officials a common development agenda that enabled them to rise above 
vested interests and implement socio-economic reforms. In the case of 
Carpenter (2000), state autonomy was gained through the intellectual and 
entrepreneurial abilities of bureaucrats.  
There exists various examples whereby the bureaucracies of some states 
have designed better administrative procedures than others, to ensure teacher 
accountability14. Sipahimalani-Rao’s (2004) comparative study of teacher 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 India has a federal framework. Power is distributed between the federal government (the 
Centre) and the respective state governments. In 1976, the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution 
of India shifted education, which was so long a state subject to the concurrent list. This means 
that state governments have been allotted the freedom and the resources to design and 
implement their own policies and schemes in the education sector so long as they are consistent 
with national plans for education. 
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management policies in Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, for example, reveals how 
much more the Karnataka State Government had done for ensuring teacher 
accountability than that of Uttar Pradesh. A key difference between the two 
states is the implementation of a software-based automated system of teacher 
transfers in Karnataka. The system, based on an objective criteria, has helped 
streamline a process that was once riddled with nepotism and corruption 
(Bhatnagar, 2004, pp. 48-49). Even the rules for prioritising certain requests for 
transfers over others are transparent. When Sipahimalani-Rao (2004) conducted 
her study in 2003-2004, such initiatives were missing in the case of Uttar 
Pradesh, leaving much greater scope for political discretion. 
The establishment of enlightened policies and administrative structures to 
promote greater accountability and transparency within the system can be 
viewed as attempts made by respective state governments to insulate their 
bureaucracy from excessive political interference. But in order to formulate and 
implement such policies and arrangements these state governments must have 
had some autonomy from the influence of politicians and teachers’ unions 
interested in maintaining the low levels of teacher accountability for personal 
gain. The question that remains unanswered by the literature on India is how 
such autonomy has been established and maintained, especially in the face of 
clientelist pressures.  
Therefore, the literature may have clearly established the differences in 
teacher management policies and administrative structures amongst the various 
states in India. But it has yet to capture the processes that enable some state 
governments to advance enlightened policies and administrative arrangements 
more than others. A further investigation is required to reveal these processes.  
11 
 
The answer to the puzzle of K.R. Nagara’s success within the context of 
clientelism and H.D. Kote’s disappointment within the context of robust civic 
action could probably be answered by state capacity. The main aim of this 
dissertation therefore is to establish if K.R. Nagara’s performance is a result of 
state capacity. If so, I hope to seek out the processes that provided the state in 
K.R. Nagara the autonomy it requires to ensure teacher accountability. In 
addition, an enquiry will be made into why state capacity is lacking in the case 
of H.D. Kote despite the presence of strong civic action. 
I chose to do an in-depth comparative analysis on two blocks from within 
the same district because it is the education bureaucracy at the sub-district level 
that has been empowered in most states to conduct in-service trainings for 
teachers and decide which teachers to supervise, sanction or recommend for 
transfers or promotions. Therefore, an enquiry into the processes that enable 
state capacity at the sub-district level would be particularly useful given that it 
is these block-level education officials who ultimately influence the level of 
teacher accountability by determining if state-wide and nation-wide policies and 
schemes are implemented effectively (or not).   
To conduct this enquiry successfully, I invoked a method known as process 
tracing15. I traced the processes by which teacher accountability was achieved 
more in K.R. Nagara and less in H.D. Kote. A combination of qualitative data 
collection methods were used to achieve this. It included a preliminary analysis 
of governmental reports, NGO documents,  national dailies followed by in-
                                                                                                                                                        
15 In political science, process tracing is most often used with an intention of tracing causal 
mechanisms. It involves unwrapping the cause-effect link that connects the independent variable 
and outcome by dividing it into smaller steps and looking for any observable evidence at each 
step (Van Evera, 1997, p. 64). 
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depth interviews with primary school teachers, senior education officials, trade 
union representatives, civil society groups and parents of school going children 
from both blocks. 
The next chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 2, explores the processes by 
which teacher accountability is achieved within the constraints of clientelism. 
From a review of the literature of comparative politics and the relevant literature 
of teacher accountability in India, civic action and state capacity were identified 
as the two main processes driving clientelist tendencies away from the system. 
Insights gained from the field of comparative politics were also used to explore 
and highlight areas not yet addressed by the literature on teacher accountability 
in India. 
Chapter 3, describes the methodology used to examine whether state 
capacity or civic action can systematically account for the differing levels of 
teacher accountability between two blocks in India. It provides insight into why 
a comparative approach was adopted and why K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote were 
selected for comparison. Through the selection process, I found clientelism 
present in both these blocks. I was also able to rule out civic action as a 
systematic explanation as it did not lead to its expected outcomes in either K.R. 
Nagara or H.D. Kote. Therefore, I had to determine if state capacity had a more 
significant role in influencing outcomes instead. To do this, I invoked a method 
known as process tracing.  
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss my findings and demonstrate how state capacity is 
an integral component to achieving teacher accountability in India. Chapter 4 
focuses on K.R. Nagara. It demonstrates how bureaucratic strategies of 
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consensus-building and reputation-building insulate the education bureaucracy 
from the clientelist pressures of the wider political system. The relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the political class that has developed over the years 
as a result of these enlightened strategies has provided the state in K.R. Nagara 
significant operational latitude and support in ensuring teacher accountability. 
Through qualitative data collected in the field, I will also show how this has 
resulted in the effective functioning of schools in K.R. Nagara.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the case of H.D. Kote. It demonstrates how the 
bureaucracy in H.D. Kote is the ‘handmaiden’ of the political class16. As 
particular parties and caste communities strive to gain greater control of the 
administration, positions within the bureaucracy remain highly politicised. 
Senior education officials are transferred out ever so quickly before they can 
even perform and officials at the lower rungs of the bureaucracy act as nodal 
points in mobilising local support for the political class. The lack of credible 
leadership and bureaucratic laxity has led to low levels of teacher accountability 
in H.D. Kote. It has also resulted in schools running much more inefficiently. 
All this despite the active and long standing presence of NGOs throughout the 
block. I found evidence to suggest that the nature of NGO involvement in H.D. 
Kote may have stifled bureaucratic initiative instead. Thus producing a 
bureaucracy largely apathetic to working efficiently towards goals like teacher 
accountability and more prone to the inflictions of clientelism.  
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by summarising why K.R. Nagara has 
been more successful than H.D. Kote in ensuring teacher accountability. This 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 The term ‘handmaiden’ is used by Marx (1848) to describe the state. The state, in his view, is 




dissertation’s key findings point to the importance of the bureaucracy and the 
nature of its relationship with the political class in the delivery of public 
services. This chapter also states this dissertation’s limitations and recommends 



















2. THEORATICAL APPLICATION 
 
This chapter begins with a description of clientelism which is the main 
challenge to accountable public service delivery. I then explore the processes 
by which accountability is achieved within the constraints of clientelism. This 
exploration is within the literature of comparative politics as accountability 
involves stakeholders, both of society and state. The field of comparative 
politics considers how development outcomes are influenced by processes that 
take place within and between society and the state. The insights gained are then 
used to explore and highlight the areas that have been addressed and also not 
addressed by the relevant literature on teacher accountability in India. 
2.1 Framing the Challenge - Clientelism  
 
Despite its common use, accountability remains an amorphous concept that 
is difficult to define. Mulgan (2000, p. 555) views accountability to be a 
“complex and chameleon-like term”. Savage and Moore (2004, p. 4) note it to 
be “elusive” and “ambiguous”. But widely accepted is Schedler’s (1999) 
observation that accountability entails both answerability (individuals or 
organisations report to a recognised authority) and enforceability (the capacity 
to impose penalties for poor performance). 
The World Bank, in World Development Report 2004, clearly articulates 
the ideal relationships that 3 main actors must have with one another for 
accountability to be achieved (see Figure 1.). According to this Report, the 3 
main actors are the users of the service (parents and children), the state 




Figure 1. The World Bank's Accountability Framework 
 
 
              Source: World Bank Report 2004, p. 49 
The above diagram explains the interaction of the 3 ideal relationships as 
follows: 
1. Users of the service hold the state accountable through the electoral 
process by using their voice and votes. 
2. The state holds providers of this service accountable for their behavior 
through effective management. 
3. Users directly express their demand for the service and monitor the 
provider’s delivery of that service.    
The first and second relationships lead to what the World Bank calls the ‘long 
route’ to accountability. The ‘short route’ to accountability is the third 
relationship which runs directly from the users to the providers of the service, 
bypassing the state. 
In reality, these relationships are far more complicated and do not always 
turn out as prescribed. Most often, it is clientelism that inhibits these 
relationships. Cleintelism refers to the excessive tendency amongst the political 
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class to provide public services to specific individuals or communities in 
exchange for political support.  The World Bank’s Report pays significant 
attention to the challenges posed by clientelism. But I would like to highlight 
the scholarly work of Chandra (2004) as it clearly establishes the causal link 
between clientelism and unequal public service delivery. 
Chandra (2004) observes that voters in India seek personal benefits from 
the state (e.g. school/university admissions, jobs, housing, medical care, 
housing loans and land grants).  Under severe information constraints, these 
voters choose political parties not based on the ideology or proven track record 
of the political party but on the number of fellow caste members in influential 
positions within that political party. To retain and gain more votes, the political 
class is thereby forced to favour voters from their “own” caste community when 
distributing state resources. Observing this trend, voters in turn place greater 
trust in politicians from their “own” caste. This reinforces ethnic favouritism 
within the system. 
More specifically, there is substantive literature that asserts clientelism to 
be a major cause of low levels of teacher accountability in government-run 
schools in India. The political class gives particularistic benefits to these 
teachers in return for their electoral support. They are also known to harass and 
intimidate teachers who do not support them with unfavourable transfers. In 
Rajasthan, for example, Sharma (2009, p. 162) observes how “transfers were 
regarded as ways of ‘obliging’ teachers who were close to powerful people, or 
doled out as a reward (or punishment, as the case may be) for services rendered 
such as assistance in political campaigns”. 
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The political class has a strong incentive to engage with teachers. Being 
among the few educated and influential people in a village and often employed 
as election officials, teachers are valued for their ability to mobilise the electoral 
support of villagers for local leadership. Likewise, teachers have a strong 
incentive to cultivate relations with politicians, especially those who can gain 
for themselves favourable transfers and promotions. A favourable transfer or 
promotion would enable a teacher to work comfortably in an environment of 
his/her choice. Moreover, a skewed incentive structure persists whereby 
teachers posted to urban areas receive higher living allowances, while those 
posted to remote rural areas with poor facilities receive little to no additional 
compensation. Thus, teachers typically enlist the help of powerful politicians to 
achieve favourable postings or transfers. But in doing so, spend most of their 
time cultivating relations with these politicians rather than in the classrooms 
actively engaged in teaching.   
On a macro scale, this mutual dependence drives clientelist exchanges 
between politicians and teacher unions. The demands of teacher unions usually 
include the advancement of salaries and other emoluments. But qualitative data 
on India suggests that the demands of teacher unions frequently extend into 
areas clearly against the interest of schools and students. For example, 
Ramachandran & Sharma (2009) find in their interviews with education 
officials in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, that teacher unions support 
unprofessional practices, including condoning teacher absenteeism. Politicians 
most often pander to such demands to gain greater political support as teacher 
unions are capable of collectively organising the largest group of government 
employees. In Uttar Pradesh, the knowledge that powerful unions are protecting 
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them, encourages teachers to be lax in their behaviour towards school by being 
absent, arriving late and departing early (Kingdon & Muzammil, 2009).  
The education bureaucracy which is supposed to enforce teacher 
accountability is depicted as either complicit or bogged down by the clientelist 
political system through which it operates. Ramachandran & Sharma (2009), 
note the difficulty that education officials face in both Andhra Pradesh and 
Rajasthan in disciplining erring teachers in the presence of such politically 
strong teacher unions.  
The lack of teacher accountability is a considerable challenge for India.  
Empirical studies prove that the average rate of teacher absenteeism is still high 
across rural India, falling only modestly from 26.3 percent in 2003 to 23.6 
percent in 2010 (Muralidharan et al., 2014, p.11). Even if teachers do show up 
in schools, field investigators on their unannounced visits, observe the late 
arrival and early departure of many and a shocking lack of teaching (De et al., 
2011, pp. 35-36). Studies, however, demonstrate that there are significant inter 
and intra state variations in teacher accountability across India. Teacher 
absenteeism can be has high as 45.8 percent in the state of Jharkhand and as low 
as 12.9 percent in the state of Tamil Nadu (De et al., 2011, p.9). This indicates 
that some states have been more successful than others in addressing teacher 
accountability within the constraints of clientelism. Why is this so? 
2.2 Processes Promoting Teacher Accountability 
 
I now delve deeper into the literature on teacher accountability in India to 
seek out the processes by which higher levels of teacher accountability is 
achieved in some states more than others. I use the framework for analysing 
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developmental outcomes within the field of comparative politics as a guide to 
do so. The field of comparative politics considers how development outcomes 
are influenced by processes emanating from both state and society. This is an 
important consideration as teacher accountability involves stakeholders, of both 
state and society.  
a. Society-Driven Processes 
The first approach in the field of comparative politics attributes 
developmental outcomes to processes emanating from society. Comparative 
scholars adhering to this approach demonstrate how effective governance is 
achieved through civic action. Civic action is also depicted in the literature on 
teacher accountability in India as key to driving clientelistic tendencies away 
from the system, thus ensuring greater accountability. Before citing instances 
from the literature on teacher accountability in India, I cite various examples of 
civic action achieving better development outcomes from the literature of 
comparative politics. 
Putnam (1993) explains the basis of civic action to be social capital. Social 
capital, which entails interpersonal trust, networks and norms, makes citizens 
more willing to engage in collective action for a common benefit. Putnam 
(1993) attributes the “efficient”, “creative” and “effective” performance of 
regional governments in northern Italy to the high levels of social capital 
amongst their citizens (p. 81). He observes the development of social capital to 
be a result of the active participation of citizens in associations like literary 
guilds, sports clubs, choral societies and service groups. The high level of face 
to face interactions between the individuals in these associations, lead to the 
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formation of social capital amongst them. In southern Italy, however, Putnam 
(1993) finds lower levels of social capital and under-performing regional 
governments as citizen participation in such associations is far weaker than the 
north17.  
Putnam (1993), however, has been criticized by some scholars for 
neglecting the negative aspects of civic engagement. Citing the ethnic killings 
in Rwanda and Bosnia, Levi (1996) indicates how the capacity to engage in 
collective action may at times be more harmful than beneficial to society. 
Similarly Ostrom (1997), indicates how the Ku Klux Klan organisations, which 
advocated white supremacy through extremist and violent means in the United 
States, had grown out of active associational life.  
Krishna (2002), however, asserts that it is in the presence of capable agents 
that collective action is geared towards ensuring better governance. He makes 
this conclusion from an analysis of 69 village communities across Rajasthan and 
Madhya Pradesh in India. He observes how local agents, which he terms ‘Naya 
Netas’ (new leaders), enable close-knit village communities to participate more 
effectively in local governance18. These Naya Netas, differ from the traditional 
upper caste leadership of the village. They are younger, better educated and 
mostly from the lower castes. The Naya Netas raise the interests and concerns 
of these villagers to powerful individuals within the state. They also convey to 
the villagers any information and responses these powerful individuals may 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Putnam’s (1993) idea of social capital has been strongly taken up by the World Bank. The 
promotion of civic engagement and community driven development has thereby become the 
basis of the World Bank’s development strategy. By 1997 the concept of social capital was 
described by the World Bank as the ‘missing link in development’ (Harriss, 1997). 
18 Likwise, Reddy and Hargopal (1985) & Manor (2000) in their works demonstrate the 
important role that local mediators play within the village.  
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have for them. In bringing their voices closer to the state, these Naya Netas 
enable villagers to place greater pressure on the state and its agencies to deliver.  
Krishna (2011), in a subsequent study, finds that 64 percent of the villagers 
he interviewed turned to Naya Netas for assistance in getting a non-performing 
teachers replaced. Amongst the remaining respondents, 4 percent turned to party 
representatives; 18 percent to Panchayat leaders (leaders of local self-
governments) and 11 percent to caste leaders for assistance (p. 110)19.  Likewise 
there exists numerous instances within the literature on India whereby NGOs 
and social movements effectively challenge the strong interests involved in 
perpetuating low levels of teacher accountability. 
Mythili (2002), for example, observes the positive effect of high levels of 
community pressure on teachers and education officials to deliver higher quality 
education. She traces the popular participation of parents to the presence of 
intellectual, political and apolitical movements in the region since times past. In 
a block that is perpetually short of teachers, she observes that whoever is elected 
as Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), will not permit senior education 
officers within the block to issue transfer orders until there were substitute 
teachers. Mythili (2002), also records teachers feeling a sense of pressure from 
the close attention parents pay, including those parents who are illiterate and 
from the labouring class20. This is in contrast to Uttar Pradesh, where Drèze and 
Gazdar (1996) attribute the persistently poor delivery of education to ‘public 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 In 1992, the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution set out a uniform 3 tiered local self-
government structure across India known as the Panchayati Raj. For more information on the 
Panchayati Raj system, see Mullen (2012, pp. 74-76). 
20 There are studies that demonstrate how the low levels of literacy and unstable economic 




inertia’. They identify the inertia to be a result of the comparatively weak 
presence of social movements challenging the oppressive social patterns in the 
region. 
The presence of social movements can build bridges and consensus among 
different social groups representing diverse interests. In states where there have 
been sustained socio-cultural movements against caste oppression, like Tamil 
Nadu and Kerala, the delivery of universal education has been more successful 
because of the high political priority accorded to it21. An essential factor in the 
success of Tamil Nadu’s Mid-Day Meal programme was a politically conscious 
parent community (Swaminathan, Sreenivasan & Jayashree, 1991, pp. 2989). 
Pioneered in Tamil Nadu, the Mid-Day Meal Programme is now being 
implemented across India.  
NGOs have also been observed to initiate social movements that have 
sought to make teachers and bureaucrats more accountable in the delivery of 
education. By providing socially marginalised communities with information 
on how the educational system ought to function, NGOs work amongst 
communities to build their capacity to engage actively with teachers and 
education officials. Clarke & Jha (2006), for example, illustrate how the 
delivery of education in rural Rajasthan had improved in the 1980s and 1990s 
due to non-political non-governmental driven rural education initiatives. Most 
notably, is the influential activist type work of Mazdoor Kishan Shakti 
Sangathan (MKSS). Their role in organising Jan Sunwais (public hearings), 
demanding increased accountability and the scrutiny of school records has 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 For the Kerala experience see Drèze & Sen (2002, p .97-100). 
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played a part in ensuring the efficient provision of public schooling in 
Rajasthan. The MKSS movement has thereby enabled rural communities to 
become more informed and better prepared in demanding effective and efficient 
services from the state.  
Similar to MKSS, is the work of another NGO, Mamidipudi 
Venkatarangaiya Foundation (MV Foundation), in Andhra Pradesh. The MV 
Foundation adopts an inclusive approach towards strengthening the existing 
government school system (Wazir, 2002). It stimulates awareness and demand 
for quality education among the poor. Through a process of negotiation and 
consensus building, the MV Foundation also wins over adversaries, like the 
local employees of child labour, errant teachers and apathetic education 
officials, who act as constraints to the universal and efficient delivery of quality 
education. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the literature on teacher 
accountability in India has significantly and systematically established the 
causal link between teacher accountability and civic action. Now we shall see 
how well it has fared in illustrating the state-driven processes by which teacher 
accountability is achieved.   
b. State-Driven Processes 
The second approach in comparative politics accords the state a greater role 
in determining developmental outcomes. It is unlike the first approach, which 
views the state as “a mere arena in which social groups make demands and 
engage in political struggles or compromises” (Skocpol, 1985, p.8). Instead, it 
acknowledges the state as a compulsory association with administrative, legal, 
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extractive and coercive functions, capable of formulating and pursing goals 
independent of the interests of social groups, classes or society22. The ability of 
a state to effectively implement its official goals in the face of social opposition 
is recognised conceptually as ‘state capacity’ (Skocpol, 1985, p.9).  But state 
capacity is only possible if the state possesses a certain degree of autonomy from 
the influence of powerful groups within society. Therefore, scholars adhering to 
the second approach demonstrate the processes through which state 
bureaucracies insulate themselves so as to effectively pursue developmental 
goals such as accountable public service delivery.  
Trimberger (1978), for example, describes how bureaucrats in Japan, 
Turkey, Egypt, and Peru were able to seize power from the dominant classes 
(i.e. landed, commercial, or industrial classes) and reorient national economic 
development. She observes the extent of economic change to be dependent on 
how free these bureaucrats were from ties or alliances with the dominant classes. 
According to her, a bureaucracy can be said to be autonomous when the officials 
holding high posts in it satisfy two conditions: 1) “they are not recruited from 
dominant landed, commercial, or industrial classes”; and 2) “they do not form 
close personal and economic ties with these classes after their elevation to high 
office” (p. 17).   
Likewise, Stepan (1978) demonstrates how officials within the bureaucracy 
in Peru used state power to rise above vested interests so as to implement socio-
                                                                                                                                                        
22 Such a recognition of the state comes from Weber. Weber views the state as a compulsory 
association with administrative, legal, extractive and coercive functions, capable of formulating 
and pursing goals independent of the interests of social groups. For an excellent summary of the 
Weber’s theory of the state refer to Stepan (1978, Op.citt, pp. xi-xiv). Stepan elaborates on the 
state’s power to not only structure relationships between state and society but also the 
relationship within society.  
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economic reforms and plans for further industrialisation. But unlike Trimberger 
(1978), who argues the basis of autonomy to be a social structural one, Stepan 
finds it to be a result of prior socialisation. The training schools that the 
bureaucrats within Peru’s military regime went to taught techniques and ideas 
of national economic planning, in addition to providing military training. A 
‘core programmatic consensuses’ thereby existed amongst these officials over 
the desirability of using state intervention to promote national economic 
development.  
Other scholars, like Carpenter (2000), highlight the intellectual and 
entrepreneurial abilities of bureaucrats in diagnosing and overcoming socio-
political problems as the basis of autonomy23. Carpenter (2000) describes how 
American post officials within the Post Office Department (POD) built 
“coalitions of esteem” across contentious party and class lines by increasing the 
department’s overall reputation for efficiency. In return, these “coalitions of 
esteem” supported the POD’s bid for greater control over its organisation and 
the ability to experiment in its operations.   
The above discussion demonstrates the processes by which the state was 
able to insulate itself from the excessive political interference so as to achieve 
better developmental outcomes. In a similar manner, there are studies on India 
that attribute variations in teacher accountability to factors internal to the state. 
The bureaucracies of some states have designed better teacher management 
policies (i.e. hiring, transfer, promotion, supervision and sanction) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 See also Heclo (1974), where he attributes the minimalist state pension system of Britain 
(prior to the 1960s) to the lack of bureaucratic expertise and resources.  
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administrative structures that leave the state more insulated from political 
interference.  
Sipahimalani-Rao’s (2004) comparative study of teacher management 
policies in Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, for example, reveals how much more 
the Karnataka State Government had done for ensuring teacher accountability 
than that of Uttar Pradesh. A key difference between the two states is the 
implementation of a software-based automated system of teacher transfers in 
Karnataka. The system, based on an objective criteria, has helped streamline a 
process that was once riddled with nepotism and corruption (Bhatnagar, 2004, 
pp. 48-49). Even the rules for prioritising certain requests for transfers over 
others are transparent.  
When Sipahimalani-Rao (2004) conducted her study in 2003-2004, such 
initiatives were missing in the case of Uttar Pradesh, leaving much greater scope 
for political discretion24. Furthermore, in Uttar Pradesh, teachers are guaranteed 
representation in the upper house of the state legislature. Such a provision has 
given teachers and their unions significant political clout. This has enabled them 
to dictate the governance of schooling on their own terms. This has resulted in 
increasing salaries and benefits for teachers, but less progress in improving the 
efficient functioning and quality of schools in Uttar Pradesh (Kingdon & 
Muzzamil, 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 Likewise, Priyam (2011) illustrates how far Bihar is from achieving the levels of 
rationalisation and transparency seen within the education system in Andhra Pradesh. The 
Andhra Pradesh State Government through successive orders has specified the rules for teacher 
transfer eligibility in detail. The posting of school vacancies and teacher transfer applications is 
on websites for everyone to see. This has also led to greater transparency and a significant 
reduction in favoured postings and arbitrary transfers. The Bihar State Government may have 
taken initiatives to standardise the recruitment process but it has expressed limited interest in 




In another example, Sharma (2009) attributes the difference in the state 
capacities of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan to variations in their administrative 
structures. She argues that Andhra Pradesh’s administrative structure is 
“marginally better” because it has a stable well-accepted system by which it 
recruits all its teachers (p. 159). Candidates are required to take a highly 
competitive common entrance examination at the district level. According to 
Sharma (2009), only 1 to 2 per cent of the candidates are selected eventually.   
In contrast, Rajasthan’s recruitment system is characterised by instability 
and frequent wavering. Up to 1998, teachers were either recruited by the 
Panchayats to teach Standards 1 to 8 or by the Department of Education to teach 
Standards 6 to 10.  In 1998, the recruitment of regular teachers had however 
come to a halt in Rajasthan and para-teachers (also known as contract teachers) 
were recruited by the Panchayats instead. Unlike regular teachers, para-teachers 
have no professional teaching qualifications and are hired at lower salaries and 
on short-term contracts25. The recruitment of regular teachers resumed in 2004. 
This instability, therefore, did not allow the bureaucracy to develop 
competencies that enabled it to manage teachers more effectively. 
The above mentioned literature on India merely demonstrates the 
importance of state capacity in ensuring teacher accountability. It falls short of 
not having accounted for the autonomy required to implement such enlightened 
strategies in the face of clientelism26.  Few scholars on India have examined 
how state autonomy is achieved so as to ensure the efficient delivery of public 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 Rajasthan was the first state to start using contract teachers with the Shiksha Karmi Project. 
Many states followed soon after with schemes like Shikshan Sewak in Maharashtra, Guruji in 
Madhya Pradesh, and Vidhya Sahayak in Gujrat. Some states like Karnataka, for example, do 




services. One exception is the work of Mukherji and Jha (2014) which attributes 
the success of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS) in Andhra Pradesh to the Chief Minister’s ability to 
insulate a committed rural development bureaucracy from the negative 
influence of farmers keen on thwarting the program for their own personal gain.   
2.3 What the Literature on Teacher Accountability in India has Not 
Addressed 
 
Unaddressed by the literature on teacher accountability in India, therefore, 
is how state autonomy can be established and maintained, especially in the 
presence of politicians and teachers’ unions interested in maintaining the low 
levels of teacher accountability for personal gain. The processes by which the 
more efficient bureaucracies navigate the clientelist political systems, through 
which they operate, have not yet been systematically examined. The insights 
gained from such an analysis would be valuable given the important role 
accorded to the bureaucracy in ensuring teacher accountability in India. 
Firstly, the bureaucracy has been conferred significant administrative, 
technical and coercive capabilities to ensure teacher accountability and 
performance. Only the bureaucracy can initiate disciplinary action against errant 
teachers in the form of suspension or show-cause notices27. Secondly, to provide 
better academic support and monitor the performance of teachers more closely, 
the bureaucracy has been equipped in recent years with significantly more 
                                                                                                                                                        
27 A show-cause notice is issued to a teacher, asking why he or she should not be charged with 
an offense/action that's against the rules or law. In most instances, a preliminary investigation 
would follow in order to determine if the cause given is satisfactory or not. If there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the teacher or officer is guilty of the offense/action, disciplinary action 
will be meted out. 
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financial resources and its reach extended to individual teachers with the 
creation of resource centres at the block and cluster level28.  
Prior to the creation of Block Resource Centres and Cluster Resource 
Centres, only the Block Education Office existed at the sub-district level. In 
most states today, Block Education Offices which oversee the administrative 
functioning of schools in respective blocks are accompanied by Block Resource 
Centres and Cluster Resource Centres. These centres oversee and support the 
academic functioning of schools (see Table 2).  
Table 2: The Sub-district Offices of the Department of Education. 
Who’s Responsible for What in Teacher Management? 
Name of Office Key Officials Role and Responsibilities 
Block Education Office Block Education Officer  
 
Education Coordinators   
Administrative 
a. Oversee the allocation, 
deputation, transfer, promotion, 
suspension and sanction of 
government school teachers 
within the  block 
Block Resource Centre Block Resource Coordinator   
  
Block Resource Persons  
Academic 
a. Receive and mange training 
funds, plan training schedules 
and maintain records on all 
trainings conducted in the 
block. 
b. Visit schools from time to time 
observe classroom activity. 
c. Appraise the performance of 
teachers 








Cluster Resource Person Administrative and Academic 
a. Visit schools under their 
purview regularly to observe 
classroom activity, deliver 
model lessons, check records 
and have discussions with 
teachers and SMC members to 
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Resources centres were initially set up at the block and cluster levels under the District 
Primary Education Programme (DPEP) to improve the quality of education in schools. 
Launched in 1994, DPEP was implemented in a phased manner in selected districts. 
Subsequently, Sarva Shiksha Abiyan (SSA), launched in 2001, extended this provision to 











clarify any doubts that may 
arise. 
b. Collect and compile data on all 
aspects of SSA support received 
by schools and teachers. 
(Source: Compiled by the Author) 
At the apex of each Block Education Office, is the Block Education 
Officer who is assisted by several Education Coordinators and clerks. These 
senior officers oversee the allocation, deputation, transfer, promotion, 
suspension and sanction of government school teachers under their purview. 
These officers are accompanied by the officers deputed to the Block Resource 
Centres [the Block Resource Coordinator with several Block Resource 
Persons], and Cluster Resource Centres [the Cluster Resource Person]. Officers 
deputed to Block Resource Centres and Cluster Resource Centres are assigned 
the task of training and monitoring the activities of teachers under their purview.  
It may seem, with the passing of the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act (“RTE”) in 2009, that some of the responsibility for 
ensuring teacher accountability and performance has shifted to parents and 
community members, in the form of School Monitoring Committees (SMCs)29. 
The onus, however, is still very much on the bureaucracy to ensure teacher 
accountability and performance.  
                                                                                                                                                        
29 The RTE mandates that all government funded primary schools have a SMC comprising of 
parents of school going children, teachers and elected representatives of the Panchayat. It 
clearly specifies that at least 75 percent of SMC members be parents/ guardians of children 
enrolled in the school and that 50 percent of them be women. In addition, to ensure the fair 
representation of social groups within the village, traditionally marginalised and weaker 
segments of the community are to be represented in proportion to their population in the village. 
In addition to monitoring teacher attendance and performance, the SMC of each school is to 
prepare the school’s annual development plan and monitor the utilisation of funds for the 
development and maintenance of the school. 
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Firstly, baseline surveys (both government and non-government) report 
that a large proportion of SMCs across India remain unrepresentative and 
ineffective, especially in ensuring teacher accountability (Pandey et al., 2010; 
CREATE, 2011; PAISA, 2012 & SSA JRM State Reports, 2014)30. Secondly, 
it is the department of education which plays a crucial role in how well SMCs 
perform. It is the Head Master who most often informs SMC members of their 
roles and responsibilities and facilitates the process of engagement between 
school, teachers, parents and children. In addition, it is the responsibility of 
Cluster Resource Person’s to conduct annual trainings for SMCs at the Gram 
Panchayat level31. Therefore, the bureaucracy, especially at the sub-district level 
has an important role in ensuring teacher accountability.    
Moreover, I find from a comparison of two blocks in Karnataka, called K.R. 
Nagara and H.D. Kote, that civic action is unable to systematically account for 
their differing levels of teacher accountability. This suggests the important role 
state capacity may have had instead. To establish this better, I explore in this 
dissertation the role of state capacity in influencing teacher accountability in 
K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote. I seek out the processes that provide the state in 
K.R. Nagar with the autonomy it requires to ensure teacher accountability. 
Additionally, I explore what makes the state in H.D.Kote less inclined to 
becoming autonomous.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
30 The commonly cited issues include the internal weakness of SMCs, with members not being 
aware of their membership, roles and responsibilities, and the capture of these institutions by 
those with vested interests.  They cite instances of collusion between teachers and dominant 
individuals within the community and teachers not disclosing financial resources or attaining 
the necessary expenditure approvals from majority of the committee. 
31 The Gram Panchayat is the local self-government at the village level. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used to examine whether state 
capacity or civic action can systematically account for the differing levels of 
teacher accountability between two blocks in India. It provides insight into why 
a comparative approach was adopted and why K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote were 
selected for comparison. Both these blocks are from the same district within 
Karnataka called Mysore. Through the selection process, I found clientelism 
present in both these blocks. I was also able to rule out civic action as a 
systematic explanation as it did not lead to its expected outcomes in either K.R. 
Nagara or H.D. Kote. Therefore, I had to determine if state capacity had a more 
significant role in influencing outcomes instead. To do this, I used a method 
known as process tracing. By comparing K.R. Nagara and H.D Kote, I will be 
better able to systematically demonstrate how state capacity is an integral 
component to achieving teacher accountability in India.  
3.1 Case Selection  
 
According to Collier (1993, p. 105), the use of comparative research 
“sharpens our power of description, and plays a central role in concept-
formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among 
cases”. George and Bennet (2005, p.18) state that the strongest means of 
drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of methods. 
These include a within case analysis approach and cross-case comparison within 
a single study.  
In comparative research, there is a method by which cases are carefully 
selected for analysis.  Therefore, before demonstrating the process by which 
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K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote were selected, I will discuss the rationale behind 
the selection process by highlighting insights from the literature on comparative 
methods.  
Case selection in comparative politics usually follows either John Stuart 
Mill’s “Method of Difference” or “Method of Agreement” (Van Evera, 1997, 
pp. 23-25). In the Method of Difference, the researcher chooses cases with 
similar general characteristics but different values on the dependent variable 
(the variable whose causes a researcher seeks to establish). However in the 
Method of Agreement, the researcher chooses cases with different general 
characteristics and similar values on the dependent variable. I used Mill’s 
Method of Difference throughout the entire selection process.  
Scholars, like King, Keohane & Verba (1996), warn us against selecting 
cases on the Mill’s Method basis of different values on the dependent variable32. 
They argue that the inferences emerging from cases selected on the basis of 
different values on the dependent variable will most probably be biased. There 
will be an overstating or understating of the relationship between the cause and 
effect. But there are other scholars like Dione (1998) who acknowledge the 
utility in selecting cases on the basis of differing values on the dependent 
variable, especially if the research agenda is one that is heuristic in nature. A 
researcher can test if a variable is necessary for a selected outcome or identify 
the potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable. 
As this dissertation is mostly heuristic in nature, I selected the cases for 
comparison on the basis of differing values on the dependent variable, teacher 
                                                                                                                                                        
32 For greater elaboration on the pit falls of choosing cases based on different values of the 
dependent variable see Geddes (1990).  
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accountability.  This dissertation thereby hopes to establish the cause-effect 
relationship between state capacity, the independent variable (the probable 
cause), and teacher accountability and highlight the processes by which state 
capacity is achieved (or lost). This is an area that has yet to be addressed by the 
literature on teacher accountability in India (see Section 2.3 of this dissertation).    
Mill’s Method of Difference also specifies that the cases share similar 
general characteristics. According to Van Evera (1997) selecting cases with 
similar backgrounds creates a semi-controlled environment that limits the 
effects of many other explanations on the dependent variable33. However, it has 
been well acknowledged in the literature on comparative methods that it is 
extremely difficult to find cases that resemble each other so closely. In addition, 
a researcher can never be so sure if he/she has identified all the factors that may 
affect the dependent variable (Collier & Collier, 1991; George & Bennet, 2004 
& King, Keohane & Verba, 1996).  
To compensate for the above limitation, another method known as process 
tracing is commonly invoked by researchers34. This method enables researchers 
to clearly unwrap the cause-effect link that connects the independent variable 
and outcome. The method of process tracing and its use in this dissertation will 
be discussed later in this chapter (see Section 3.2).  
The two cases, K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote, were selected from within the 
same state so as to control the influence differing state-wide policies and 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 This method is called a controlled comparison. It is a study of two or more instances of a well 
specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one. As it is extremely 
difficult to find two cases that resemble each other in every aspect but one the study is deemed 
‘semi’.  
34 Skocpol (1979), for example, recognises the difficulties in conducting a purely controlled 
comparison and supplements it with process tracing.  
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administrative frameworks may have on teacher accountability. The state of 
Karnataka was identified because it has a consistent recruitment system 
whereby all government primary school teachers are hired at the permanent 
cadre level.  This is, however, not the same in most other Indian states. In states 
like Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, contract teachers are hired in 
addition to permanent teachers35. Therefore, selecting both cases from within 
Karnataka, reduces the complexities that would arise from an analysis of teacher 
accountability within the context of differing styles of teacher management.  
Generally, contract teachers, unlike permanent teachers, have no professional 
teaching qualifications and are hired by village based communities at lower 
salaries and on short-term contracts. It is assumed that contract teachers will be 
more accountable as their contracts can be cancelled if their performance is 
deemed unsatisfactory by the local community that hires them. In reality, 
however, this is inconclusive and has been a point of constant debate36.  
Karnataka also has a standardised assessment from which the level of 
teacher accountability within each block can somewhat be objectively assessed. 
The Karnataka State Quality Assessment and Accreditation Council 
(KSQAAC), an autonomous body of the State Government of Karnataka, 
                                                                                                                                                        
35 States hire contract teachers in addition to their permanent teaching staff to achieve multi-
pronged targets like maintaining a satisfactory level of pupil-teacher ratios in schools and 
eliminating single teacher schools. The nomenclature and terms of employment of contract 
teachers vary across the different states. Rajasthan was the first state to start utilising contract 
teachers with the Shiksha Karmi Project. Many states followed thereafter with schemes like 
Shikshan Sewak in Maharashtra, Guruji in Madhya Pradesh, and Vidhya Sahayak in Gujrat 
(Pandey, 2006). Some states like Karnataka, for example, do not have a contract teacher scheme. 
36 While some academics have found both teacher attendance and activity to be higher for 
contract teachers; others have illustrated and criticised the poor performance of contract teachers 
vis-à-vis permeant teachers (Kremer et al., 2005; Goyal and Pandey , 2009; Atherton and 
Kingdon, 2010 & Pandey & Raj Rani, 2003). 
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assesses and accredits government primary and secondary schools on the 
following criteria:  learning achievement of students, availability of basic 
facilities, quality of learning environment, conduct of innovative activities, 
leadership exhibited by head master and teachers and strength of community 
participation37.  
In the literature on India, teacher accountability has most often been 
operationalised as teacher absence from schools or teacher performance in the 
schools (PROBE Team, 1999; Kremer et al., 2005; Beteille, 2009 and De et al., 
2011). Since the conduct of teachers inside and outside the classroom is 
evaluated under both the KSQAAC criteria of learning environment and 
leadership, the scores assigned to these criteria were most relevant in illustrating 
the level of teacher accountability in a school38. Therefore, the block-wise level 
of teacher accountability was ascertained by computing the average score 
assigned to the learning environment and leadership criteria of schools within 
each block. Such current and relatively representative sub-district data on 
teacher accountability would be difficult to attain in most other states39.   
It was important to corroborate the KSQAAC assessment with actual school 
observations. Therefore, as part of my field work, I visited 3 schools within each 
of the selected blocks to corroborate the KSQACC findings. The selection of 
                                                                                                                                                        
37 The assessment is conducted by KSQAAC assessors over a period of 3 days per school. The 
KSQAAC assessors are competitively selected through a competitive examination and 
interview. They are also trained to administer the standardised test in schools and assign scores 
to clearly stipulated indicators and sub-indicators under each of the above mentioned school-
quality characteristics. 
38 The students’ achievement on the standardised test could have been used but I recognise that 
it may not be as accurate a measure for teacher performance since there are many other factors 
that can affect the academic performance of students like self-motivation, parents’ education 
and family income.   
39 I obtained the KSQAAC data from the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET) in 
Mysore, Karantaka.  
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these schools and what was done during the school visits will be discussed in 
detail later in the chapter (see Section 3.2). 
Within Karnataka, the cases were selected from within the same district, 
Mysore. The district of Mysore has 9 educational blocks - H.D. Kote, K.R. 
Nagar, Hunsur, Mysore North, Mysore South, Mysore Rural, Nanjanagud, 
Tirumakudal Narsipur, and Piriyapatna. Being a middle ranking district within 
Karnataka on a number of education related variables (i.e. the learning 
achievements of students, the gap between sanctioned and working teachers, 
pupil-teacher ratio and the provision of basic class room facilities), I explored 
the differing levels of teacher accountability within Mysore. Table 3, ranks 
Mysore’s nine educational blocks based on their average KSQAAC scores for 
learning environment and leadership.  




























K.R. Nagara 76.73 Mysore Rural 83.13 
  Mysore Rural 74.65 Nanjanagud 80.11 
  Nanjanagud 73.10 K.R. Nagara 78.75 
  Periya Patna 72.86 Hunsur 75.42 
  T.N. Pura 64.46 T.N. Pura 70.31 
  Hunsur 63.68 Periya Patna 66.77 
  Mysore North 60.42 Mysore South 65.52 
  Mysore South 55.77 Mysore North 63.34 
Low H.D. Kote 53.64 H.D. Kote 61.00 
Source: KSQAAC 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 
 
As H.D. Kote has obtained the lowest score in both learning 
environment and leadership, it was identified as the case having low levels 
teacher accountability. I then proceeded to identify the other case for 
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comparison.  As per the Mill’s Method of Difference, the other case for 
comparison had to have significantly higher levels of teacher accountability but 
possess background characteristics similar to that of H.D. Kote.  
Compared to all the other blocks, K.R. Nagara is most similar to H.D. Kote 
in terms of background conditions but most different with respect to teacher 
accountability. The background conditions considered were those that have 
been identified in the wider literature to have an influence on the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of the education system – clientelism, parental 
literacy rate, economic status of parents and civic action. For information on 
these, I turned to government reports and newspaper articles from two major 
dailies, the Hindu and the Deccan Herald. I then supplemented my findings with 
the information provided by local activists working within Mysore40. Section 
3.2 of this dissertation illustrates the methods by which interviews were 
conducted at the village, block and district levels respectively. 
a. Clientelism 
As illustrated in Section 2.1, the literature clearly suggests that clientelism 
produces sub-optimal outcomes in the delivery of public services. In India, the 
political class is known to give particularistic benefits to teachers in return for 
their electoral support. Teachers are even harassed and intimidated with 
unfavourable transfers so as to ensure their ongoing political support.  As a 
result teachers with the hope of obtaining favourable transfers and promotions, 
                                                                                                                                                        
40 I have greatly benefited from discussions with Dr. Ramaswami Balasubramaniam, a 
developmental scholar and social activist who founded SVYM, The organisation has been 
working in the district of Mysore for more than 25 years. Dr Balasubramaniam is also a resident 
of Mysore.   
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spend most of their time cultivating relations with politicians rather than 
activitely teaching in the classroom.  
I found the practice of clientelism to be prevalent in both the political 
systems of K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote. Scholars like Scott (1969), Van De 
Walle (2007) & Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) demonstrate how competitive 
electoral struggle drives the use of clientelism for vote-getting41.   
In K.R. Nagara, the Vokkaliga and Kuruba caste communities, both 
Backward Castes (BCs), are numerically dominant (Census of India 2011)42.  
There are also smaller caste communities within the General Caste (GC), 
Schedule Caste (SC) and Schedule Tribe (ST) categories. Electoral voting 
occurs along caste lines and the tussle for power is mainly between the two 
dominant caste groups, the Vokkaligas and Kurubas. The intense rivalry 
between these two caste communities can be substantiated by an analysis of the 
Karnataka Legislative Assembly Election results since 1994.  
K.R. Nagar’s elected representative to the state legislature, the Member of 
Legislative Assembly (MLA), has always been from either of the two dominant 
caste communities (see Table 4). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
41 Scott (1969, p.1147) claims that “[t]he pressure to enlist adherents is obviously greatest when 
the party faces a competitive electoral struggle”. Van de Walle (2007), expects that increased 
competition in Africa will lead to a greater reliance on the direct exchange of goods for voter 
support. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, pp. 28-32) similarly argue that it is the interaction 
between political competition and levels of development that help explain the use of clientelism. 
42 Along with the SC and ST communities, BC communities are classified by the Government 
of India as socially and educationally disadvantage. To ensure their social and educational 
development, these communities are accorded certain privileges such as reservations in 
government jobs and higher education. The list of BCs is dynamic, with caste communities 
being added or removed depending on political, economic, educational and social factors. In 
Karnataka, GCs comprise of all other caste communities who are neither SCs, STs nor BCs.  
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Table 4: Political Party and Caste of MLA since 1994 General Election 
(K.R. Nagara) 
Year of General Election  
 
Party of Winner  Caste of Winner 
1994  Janata Dal Vokkaliga 
1999  Indian National Congress Kuruba 
2004  Janata Dal (Secular)* Kuruba 
2008 Janata Dal (Secular) Vokkaliga 
2013 Janata Dal (Secular) Vokkaliga 
    *Janata Dal split in 1991 into Janata Dal (United) and Janata Dal (Secular)                                        
    (Source: Election Commission of India) 
 
In addition, this block is heavily contested by two political parties, Janata 
Dal (Secular) and the Indian National Congress. It is popularly known that the 
majority of the Vokkaligas support the Janata Dal (Secular) party while the 
majority of the Kurubas support the Indian National Congress party. But from 
Table 4 above, the caste-party alignment is not as clear. A Deccan Herald article 
reports how other political parties contesting in K.R. Nagar such as Karnataka 
Janata Paksha and Bharatiya Janata Party, often field candidates to further widen 
the fractures that exist within the two dominant voting blocs (Mohammed, 
2013). Therefore, at election time, the keen political competition has got all 
parties scrambling to maintain their respective caste voters as well as gain the 
votes of the smaller caste communities.  
It is thereby not surprising to find K.R. Nagara having the highest number 
of poll code violations within Karnataka (Bennur, 2013). This suggests the 
frequent occurrence of electoral malpractice within the block. Political parties 
are also known to actively bribe the voters of this block. But the greatest display 
of clientelist political pressure upon the education system has thus far been the 
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suspension of the block’s most senior education officer, the Block Education 
Officer, for not inviting the block’s MLA Sa Ra Mahesh to the inauguration of 
a Mid-Day Meal kitchen in a school. The Block Education Officer had invited 
the opposition leader, A H Vishwanath, instead (“K.R. Nagara BEO suspended 
following ‘insult’ charge”, 2014).  
Likewise the practise of clientelism is also apparent in H.D. Kote’s political 
system. A single caste community, the Nayakas, politically and numerically 
dominates the block. In 1990, the Nayaka community had politically wrangled 
its way into being included to the list of STs by the Karnataka State Government. 
Since then, the Nayaka community has claimed most of the executive posts 
reserved for STs within the local bureaucracy and Gram Panchayats through 
clientelism (Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, 2009). The 
Nayakas are better educated and economically more advanced than the 
‘original’ Schedule Tribes (Jenu Kuraba, Kadu Kuruba, Yarava, Soliga, Hakki 
Pikki and Dongri Geraisa) communities within H.D. Kote. There are also 
smaller caste communities within the BC, GC and SC categories.   
According to Vijayalakshimi (2003), intense conflict between the Nayakas 
and ‘original’ Schedule Tribes is apparent during Panchayat elections. And the 
leaders from the BC and SC communities are observed to support the Nayakas 
in these elections. The community’s political prominence was further 
strengthened by the delimination process of 2008. This process changed H.D. 
Kote from a constituency reserved for SCs to one reserved for STs. Since then, 
mainstream political parties (Bharatiya Janata Party, Janata Dal (Secular) and 
Indian National Congress) have only fielded candidates from the Nayaka 
community to contest elections. The political jockeying of various Nayaka 
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political leaders and their respective parties, for the votes of the various caste 
communities in H.D. Kote has driven clientelism.    
In H.D. Kote, Nayaka politicians are known to harass senior officials to 
obtain favourable postings for officers of their choice. In an article published by 
The Hindu, in 2012, the Head of the District Urban Development Cell accused 
the MLA of H.D. Kote for calling her 20 to 30 times a day so that she will post 
officers of his choice. Even though it was the Deputy Commissioner who 
preceded over the postings and not her, she and her staff were ‘tormented’ by 
the MLA (“Sparks fly thick and fast between MLA and official”, 2012). 
K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote were chosen because clientelism was apparent 
in both the blocks. I was thereby able to rule out clientelism as a cause of their 
differential performance.  This also suited this dissertation’s agenda of gaining 
a better understanding on how accountability can be achieved within the 
constraints of clientelism.  
b. Parental Literacy Rate 
Parental literacy rate was an important consideration in selecting the two 
cases. This is because scholars find a strong association between parental 
literacy and children’s schooling outcomes (Dreze & Kingdon, 2001; Govinda 
& Bandyopadhyay, 2007 & Kambhampati & Pal, 2001). These authors 
demonstrate how communities with higher literacy rates are better able to 
support their children’s education and more likely to monitor the school system. 
Therefore to limit this possible influence, it was important to choose two blocks 
with similar literacy rates. K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote were selected because 
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their literacy rates are similar at 68.9% and 64.1%, respectively (Census of 
India, 2011).  
Economic Status of Parents 
Like literacy, the economic status of parents in determining schooling 
outcomes matters. Scholars highlight the importance of family wealth in 
determining schooling outcomes (Filmer & Pritchett, 1999 & Sargent and 
Hannum, 2005). The poor participation of parents in the management and 
monitoring of schools has often been attributed their unstable economic capacity 
(Wakheda & Sengupta, 2005). With the selection of K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote 
as cases, the influence of the economic status of parents on teacher 
accountability is reduced. Both K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote have similar per 
capita incomes, Rs. 29,499 and Rs. 31,199 respectively (Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, 2008, p.213).  
c. Civic Action 
In terms of parental supervision, the last two indicators (parental literacy 
rate and economic status of parents) affect the strength of civic action in the 
block. Civic action is an important variable when examining levels of teacher 
accountability. As demonstrated in Section 2.2 of this dissertation, there exists 
numerous examples of NGOs, local-level mediators and social movements 
effectively challenging the strong interests involved in perpetuating low levels 
of teacher accountability.  
The closeness of these two indicators, literary and economic status of parents  
in K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote did suggest that the level of civic action may be 
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similar in both blocks. But I found this not to be true. Paradoxically, civic action 
is much more robust in H.D. Kote than in K.R. Nagar.   
Several anti-feudal struggles and farmers’ movements may have occurred 
in H.D. Kote (Muzzafar, 2004). But more significant is the widespread 
contribution of NGOs to the block’s education system since the 1980s. Of all 
the NGOs, efforts undertaken by the Swami Vivekananda Youth Movement 
(SVYM) and the Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency (MYRADA) 
are most prominent. In addition to helping schools construct compounds, 
procure toilets, waste disposal pits, computers and drinking water facilities, 
MYRADA and SVYM have made significant efforts to strengthen School 
Monitoring Committees (SMCs) into effective accountability mechanisms43. 
SVYM, for example, made considerable attempts to enlighten parents about 
the importance of SMCs and mobilise community support for the active 
functioning of SMCs in 312 government primary schools (SVYM, 2007). This 
NGO also established a SMC Federation that collectively organised SMCs at 
the block level. It was believed that, as a group, SMCs could more effectively 
pressurise education officials into taking action on various issues like the 
insufficient provision of teachers and the poor performance of teachers in the 
classroom.  
K.R. Nagara, however, has not witnessed any anti-feudal struggle or 
farmers’ movement since time past. Neither has the block witnessed the large 
scale efforts of NGOs, like SVYM and MYRADA, towards strengthening its 
                                                                                                                                                        
43 Ascertained from discussions with both directors and field staff from SVYM and 
MYRADA and various publications available on the internet.  
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civil society44. Yet it has higher levels of teacher accountability than H.D. Kote. 
This is contrary to what has been depicted in the literature that strong civic 
action is key to driving clientelistic tendencies away from the system, thus 
ensuring teacher accountability.  Civic action has thereby not led to its expected 
outcomes in K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote.   
I was therefore able to rule out civic action as a systematic explanation to 
the differing levels of teacher accountability. By elimination, this meant that 
state capacity must have played a more significant role. I recognised the 
limitations of Mill’s Method of Difference in selecting two cases with very 
similar backgrounds. I thereby invoked another method known as process 
tracing to corroborate the preliminary findings above and identify the processes 
by which K.R. Nagara gained and maintained its state capacity to ensure teacher 
accountability. 
3.2 Process Tracing and Data Collection  
 
In political science, process tracing is most often used with an intention of 
tracing causal mechanisms (George & Bennett, 2005). It involves un-wrapping 
the cause-effect link that connects the independent variable and outcome, 
dividing it into smaller steps and then looking for observable evidence at each 
step (Van Evera, 1997, p.64). I traced from the village-level up to the district-
level the processes by which teacher accountability is ensured in K.R. Nagara 
and H.D. Kote.   
                                                                                                                                                        
44 This was confirmed in a preliminary interview with a senior education official at DIET 
Mysore who was from K.R. Nagara and had also once served as a Block Education Officer 
there. According to her, NGOs have only contributed to the infrastructural development of select 




I began my field work at the village-level.  Three villages, having various 
caste compositions and of varying distances from the block headquarters, were 
selected from both K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote (see Table 5)45.  The tribal 
hamlets in remote areas of H.D. Kote were not included in the selection process 
due to their relative inaccessibility.  
The purpose of visiting these selected villages and the government-run 
primary schools within them, was to corroborate the level of teacher 
accountability within the two blocks. It was also to interview the Head Masters, 
teachers and SMC (“SDMC”) members of these schools on how teacher 
accountability was ensured in the block46. Prior to the school visits, I obtained 
a letter of endorsement from a senior official at the District Institute of 
Education and Training (DIET), Mysore. The letter requesting the Head Masters 
of the selected schools to cooperate with us helped ease the research process 
considerably.  
                                                                                                                                                        
45 These villages were identified with the help of staff from SVYM who had years of experience 
working across the district implementing various developmental programmes.   




Table 5: Profile of the Villages Visited in K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote
Village and School Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Population Characteristics 
Total Population 321 1198 2732 3716 3717 1431 
% SC NIL 14.86 27.6 47.82 25.67 34.94 
% ST NIL 39.57 1.35 17.9 38.33 21.8 
Literacy Rate (in %) 68.29 66.36 66.6 63.36 64.93 60 
Location  
Distance from block headquarters 
(km) 26 22 8 11 8 15 
Socio-Economic Context 
Caste and Community Structure  GC community 
Predominantly 
marginal farmers.  
BCs and STs are 
numerically strong. 
Significant portion of the 
agrarian land is evenly 
distributed amongst BC 
and ST marginal farmers.  
SCs and GCs are mostly 
poor and have significantly 
less land. BCs and STs 
stay in segregated lanes in 
the main village area. SCs 
and GCs stay on the 
outskirts of the village.  
BCs are numerically 
dominant. They are 
predominantly 
marginal farmers. 
SCs are mostly 
small farmers. There 
are also STs who are 
landless and poor. 
Different castes live 
in separate localities 
near the main 
village. 
SCs are numerically dominant 
and socially and politically 
powerful. Majority of the 
population is landless. Those who 
own agrarian land are mainly 
marginal farmers. GCs , though 
numerically smaller, own slightly 
more land than SCs. There are 
also BCs (i.e. Vokkaligas) and 
STs, who are poor and own less 
land. SCs, BCs and GCs stay in 
separate lanes in the main village. 
But STs stay on the outskirts of 
the village.  
BCs and STs are numerically 
dominant.  Most BCs and 
STs are either small or 
marginal farmers. But 
slightly more agrarian land is 
owned by the BCs than STs.  
But the STs remain socially 
and politically more 
powerful.  The poorest group 
within the village are the 
SCs. They live on the 
outskirts of the village. STs 
and BCs live in separate 
localities near the main 
village.  
BCs are numerically strong 
and own slightly more than 
half the land. But it is the 
STs that are politically and 
socially more powerful. ST 
members from this village 
control the area's Gram 
Panchayat. The poorest 
group are the SCs. BCs and 
STs live together in the main 
village.  But the SCs live on 
the outskirts of the village.  
Education Profile 
Highest educational facility 
available Class V Class VIII Class VIII Class VII Class XII Class VII 
Government run Primary Schools 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Private run Primary Schools  Nil 1 Nil Nil 1 Nil 
(Source: Census of India 2011 and data collected by the 
author.)           
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The villages and their respective schools (Schools 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) were 
visited on two occasions. For the first visit, I informed head masters of the date 
of visit but not the time.  Prior to the visit, I drew up a fixed survey to establish 
the quality of the schools visited (i.e. availability of education facilities, 
enrolment, caste profile of children, presence and participation of teachers 
within and outside the classroom and the behaviour of children). During the 
visits, data was collected with the help of two survey assistants who spoke the 
local dialect, Kannada. The survey findings are summarised in Appendices 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6. 
On the second school visit six months later, I conducted interviews with the 
Head master, teachers and SDMC members of the school. The Head Master was 
informed of the date and time of our visit as SDMC members needed to be 
notified in advance. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. I 
prepared the same set of questions for each category of persons (i.e.  Head 
Master, teachers and SDMC members), but did not strictly adhere to them. It 
was important to keep the tone less formal to make participants more 
comfortable in discussing difficult subjects. This strategy was applied in all 
interviews conducted by me. All interviews had to be coded to protect the 
interviewees’ identity.  Table 6, below, illustrates the topics raised during the 
interviews at the schools. I was assisted by two interpreters. All interviews were 






Table 6: Interview Topics at the Village-Level 
Interviewees Interview Topics 
a. Head Master and Teachers 1. Nature of the trainings attended 
2. Opinions of and experiences at trainings 
3. Posting and transfer process 
4. Challenges faced at work 
5. Interactions with and perceptions of 
block education officials. 
6. Interactions and perceptions of  the 
SDMC 
7. Interaction and perceptions of GP and 
MLA 
b. SDMC Members  1. Role of Head Master in SDMC 
2. Role of SDMC in School 
3. Nature of SDMC Trainings  
4. Interactions with and perceptions of 
block education officials. 
5. Perceptions of GP and MLA. Extent of  
their  
      influence over school   
6. Interactions with head master and  
      teachers during SDMC meetings 
 
b. Block-Level 
We then conducted interviews at the block level with education officials and 
teacher association leaders within K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote (see Table 7). In 
addition, a focus group of private school teachers who have working experience 
as government school teachers in H.D. Kote were interviewed. These interviews 




Table 7. Interviews Conducted at the Block-Level 
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senior staff of an 




within the block.   6 
 
I ensured that there were overlaps in the issues and questions raised so as to 
cross check the validity of what each interviewee said (see Table 8). Likewise, 
most of the interviews were conducted in the Kannada, recorded, transcribed 






Table 8. Interview Topics at the Block-Level (K.R. Nagar and H.D. Kote) 
 
Interviewees Interview Topics 
1. Education Officials at the Block 
Education Office, Block 
Resource Center and Cluster 
Resource Centers 
2. Teacher Association Leaders 
3. Private School Teachers and 
Senior NGO Field Staff 
 
1. Status of education within the 
block over time 
2. Perception of teacher 
accountability and performance 
within the block 
3. Supervision and management 
practices (current and past) 
4. Nature of bureaucratic interaction 
with teachers  
5. Challenges faced in ensuring 
teacher accountability and 
performance 
6. Interactions with and perception 
of the community, NGOs and 
politicians. 
7. Understanding of bureaucratic  
Autonomy 
8. Achievements within the 
bureaucracy  
9. Trainings conducted by senior 
officials and for other officials 
within the bureaucracy 
10. Efficiency of education officers 
in the block  
11. Extent of political interference in 
administration (whom and how) 










Lastly at the district level, I interviewed two district education officials, one 
from the Director of Public Instruction (DDPI) office and the other from the 
DIET. Both officials had experiences of working in K.R. Nagar and H.D. Kote. 
They were asked to share their experiences working with and in the 
bureaucracies of K.R. Nagar and H.D. Kote.  The heads of two of Mysore’s 
leading NGOs, SVYM and MYRADA, each with more than 30 years working 
experience in the district were also interviewed. They were asked to share their 
experiences working in the education sector of H.D. Kote. In addition, 
throughout these district-level interviews, I cross – checked the validity of what 
education officials at the block level said. These interviews were conducted in 
English, recorded and transcribed. The findings from the interviews at the 












4. K.R. NAGARA 
 
This chapter attributes the high levels of teacher accountability in K.R. 
Nagara to strong state capacity. The education bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara has 
ensured teacher accountability with much success within the constraints of 
clientelism. To do so, the bureaucracy has had to insulate itself through the 
strategies of consensus-building and reputation-building. The relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the political class that has developed over the 
years, as a result of these strategies, has provided the state in K.R. Nagara with 
significant operational latitude and support in ensuring teacher accountability. 
4.1 High-Levels of Teacher Accountability 
 
K.R. Nagara has 220 government-run primary schools and 1175 
government primary school teachers (DIET Mysore, 2014). This block 
demonstrates high levels of teacher accountability. In the KSQAAC assessment, 
K.R. Nagara attained the highest score for learning environment of 76.73 
percent and the third highest score for leadership of 78.75 percent amongst the 
9 educational blocks in Mysore (see Table 3 on p.37 of this dissertation). The 
conduct of teachers inside and outside the classroom was evaluated under both 
learning environment and leadership. The scores assigned to these criteria are 
reflective of the level of teacher accountability in the block.  
I visited 3 schools (Schools 1, 2 and 3) from 3 different villages in K.R. 
Nagara each on two occasions to corroborate the KSQAAC results with actual 
observations from the field. On both visits to these schools, I observed that all 
teachers were present during school hours and apart from the Head Master and 
senior most teacher facilitating my visit, the rest of the teachers and students 
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were actively engaged in the classroom. The schools and their respective 
SDMCs were also functioning well. Refer to Appendices 1, 2 and 3 for a 
detailed account of each school’s performance. My findings thereby corroborate 
the KSQAAC results. 
4.2 Strong State Capacity 
 
K.R. Nagara’s success in ensuring teacher accountability is a result of 
strong state capacity. Despite this block’s clientelist political system, the 
bureaucracy here has ensured teacher accountability with much success. Refer 
to Table 2 on p. 29 of this dissertation for a description of the education officials 
at the sub-district level and what their responsibilities are with respect to teacher 
management.  
The political jockeying for votes by K.R. Nagara’s two dominant caste 
communities, the Vokkaligas and Kurubas, drives clientelism. As each caste 
community tries to gain greater control over of the administration, key positions 
within the local bureaucracy are given to members from either of the two 
communities. In addition, K.R. Nagara has the highest number of poll code 
violations in Karnataka and political parties are known to actively bribe the 
voters of this block (Bennur, 2013). This suggests the frequent occurrence of 
electoral malpractice within K.R. Nagara. 
The bureaucracy does from time to time experience the interference of 
politicians and organised interests. For example, the post of the Block Education 
Officer is politicised. The most obvious hint of clientelistic influence is that the 
Block Education Officer of K.R. Nagara, has always been from either of the two 
dominant castes (see Table 9).  
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Table 9. Block Education Officer Caste and Duration of Tenure  
(K.R. Nagara) 
SN. Duration Caste 
1 07/06/1995 to 22/06/1995  (15 days) Kuruba 
2 22/06/1995 to 30/07/1997 (2 years 1 month  8 days) Kuruba 
3 31/07/1997 to 15/07/2000 (2 years 11 months 15 days) Vokkaliga 
4 15/07/2000 to 03/03/2004 (3 years 7 months 15 days) Vokkaliga 
5 03/03/2004 to 29/05/2006 (2 years 2 months 26 days) Vokkaliga 
6 29/05/2006 to 26/11/2008 (2 years 5 months 28 days) Vokkaliga 
7 26/11/2008 to 20/07/2011 (2 years 7 months 24 days) Vokkaliga 
8 20/07/2011 to 04/07/2014 (2 years 11 months 14 days) Kuruba 
9 05/07/2014 to 05/08/2014 (1 month) Vokkaliga 
10 05/08/2014 to Present Kuruba 
  (Source: K.R. Nagara Block Education Office) 
The Block Education Officer is the most influential education official 
within the block. He/she oversees the administrative and academic functioning 
of all schools within the block (including the private schools).With respect 
teacher management, the Block Education Officer oversees the allocation, 
deputation, transfer, promotion, suspension and sanction of government school 
teachers within the block.  
A district education official who once served as a Block Education Officer 
in K.R. Nagara confirmed that the post of the Block Education Officer is 
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“politically decided” (personal communication, February 21, 2015). According 
to the K.R. Nagara’s Primary School Teachers’ Association President, whoever 
is appointed as Block Education Officer depends on the political party or caste 
community in power at the state level. 
Now the Indian National Congress is here (the majority party in the state 
legislative assembly) and the Chief Minister is a Kuruba. The Kuruba 
political leaders from our taluk go to the education minister and call their 
community education officers here. When Vokkaligas are there, they go to 
the government and call their persons. (K.R. Nagara’s Primary School 
Teachers’ Association President, personal communication, February 16, 
2015) 
Another sign that the bureaucracy is operating within a clientelistic political 
system is that the education officials get disciplined by the elected leadership 
for showing even the slightest favouritism to political opponents. In K.R. 
Nagara, a Kuruba Block Education Officer had been suspended upon the orders 
of the block’s Vokkaliga MLA for having invited the opposition leader, a 
Kuruba, instead of the MLA to inaugurate a primary school’s Midday Meal 
Kitchen (“Karnataka MLAs close ranks, get officer suspended”, 2014). 
According to a prominent social activist and development scholar in Mysore, 
the MLA’s actions were a display of political power and control over the 
teachers and education officials in the block (R. Balasubramaniam, personal 
communication, February 12, 2015). He and several other education officials 
confirm that the suspended Block Education Officer was actually a dedicated 
officer. They commented on how he was unfairly caught between the politics 
and rivalry between the two dominant castes (focus group discussion with 
education officials, February 12, 2015).  
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Teachers within the K.R. Nagara maintain relations with politicians from 
various political parties. The block’s present Block Education Officer called 
these teachers as “mini-politicians” (personal communication, February 16, 
2015). According to K.R. Nagara’s Primary School Teachers Association 
President, all parties are represented in the association and around 10 to 15 
percent of teachers out rightly support politicians at election time (personal 
communication, February 16, 2015).  
But despite the apparent clientelism, the bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara is still 
able to actively ensure the accountability of teachers under its charge. Apart 
from the mandatory in-service trainings, education officials hold regular 
meetings with teachers and the Head Masters of schools at the block level. 
Monthly meetings are conducted over two Saturdays at the Block Resource 
Center, with 50 percent of the block’s teachers attending on one of the Saturdays 
and the other 50 percent on the following Saturday’s meeting. At these 
meetings, education officials inform teachers about changes in the syllabus, 
demonstrate how lessons should be conducted and encourage teachers to share 
the challenges or issues they face. The Head Masters’ monthly meetings are 
more administrative in nature, including discussions on the maintenance of 
records, the provision of mid-day meals and the performance of teachers under 
his/her charge.  
The block’s education officials also frequently visit schools to ensure that 
the knowledge imparted at the in-service trainings and meetings are 
implemented effectively in schools. The 3 schools in K.R. Nagara that I visited 
(Schools 1, 2, and 3) all had their respective Cluster Resource Persons visit them 
every month in the previous academic year (2013-2014).  In their interviews, 
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teachers from these schools described what Cluster Resource Persons did on 
their school visits. Illustrated below are some of their responses: 
He (the Cluster Resource Person) gives advice about the teaching 
methods……He gives suggestions to the teachers on how to teach and 
manage the class and he gives administrative orders. (Teacher A in School 
1, personal communication, September 17, 2014) 
He (the Cluster Resource Person) observes our classes. He gives 
information if there is any….like about meetings. And if we have any 
problems, we tell him. When he is called for a meeting at the Block 
Education Office, he puts forth our problems there. (Teacher C in School 
2, personal communication, September 20, 2014) 
He (the Cluster Resource Person) usually stays for half the day. He goes 
and takes one class, he interacts with the students and he observes the 
teachers also. (Teacher A in School 3, personal communication, September 
18, 2014) 
Apart from the Cluster Resource Person, each school was also visited at 
least once by the Blocked Education Officer and at least thrice by a Block 
Resource Person. In separate interviews, SDMC members corroborate the above 
responses of teachers regarding the conduct of education officials on their 
school visits. Illustrated below are some of their responses: 
They (education officials) check the functioning of the school. They stay 
here for more than 4 hours, check the mid-day meal provided and 
everything. They call us when they have come to the school. (SDMC 





Education officials check the quality of education and the relationship of 
teachers with the community. The SDMC members are called and the 
inspector speaks with them. (SDMC Member A of School 2, personal 
communication, September 20, 2014). 
They (education officials) come and check the place regularly…they ask 
about the mid-day meals, the quality of education provided, the 
punctuality of the teachers and the spending of the funds…(SDMC 
Member B of School 3, personal communication, September 18, 2014). 
The bureaucracy’s ability to take action against erring teachers is a clear 
indication of K.R. Nagara’s strong state capacity. According to a teacher in 
School 3, teachers exhibiting poor behaviour in the classroom are posted to 
schools near the Block Resource Centre, so they can be monitored easily 
(Teacher C, personal communication, September 18, 2014). Another teacher in 
School 1 commented how teachers are afraid when officials visit since 
disciplinary action will be taken if anything is found wrong (Teacher A, 
personal communication, September 17, 2014). 
In the year 2014, K.R. Nagara’s Block Education Office issued 28 show 
cause notices to teachers over the dereliction of their duties47. Show cause 
notices are only issued when the allegations against a teacher are severe, that he 
or she has contravened the existing rules of the Department of Education (i.e. 
absenteeism without informing school heads or financial misconduct). A show 
cause notice forms the basis of subsequent enquiry proceedings at the district 
and state level, from which, if the accused is found guilty he/she may face stern 
disciplinary action (i.e. suspension or dismissal from service). In contrast, H.D. 
                                                                                                                                                        
47 Information provided by K.R. Nagar’s Block Resource Center on February 16, 2015. 
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Kote, the poorest performing block within the district, had issued only 8 show 
cause notices the same year48.  
K.R.Nagara bureaucracy’s proactiveness in ensuring teacher accountability 
within the constraints of clientelism goes against the predicted outcomes of 
clientelism itself. As the World Bank (2003) reports and scholars like Chandra 
(2004) argue, clientelism results in particularistic benefits to certain 
communities rather than programmatic benefits to all castes. But K.R. Nagara 
appears to be an exception, since its better performing government-run primary 
schools are attended by a significant portion of other caste communities.  
K.R. Nagara’s success is not a result of civic action. It has never had a social 
movement or the presence of NGOs working actively in the field of education. 
Rather its capacity to ensure teacher accountability is a result of two strategies 
implemented by the block’s education officials. These strategies are consensus-
building and reputation-building. These strategies have given the bureaucracy 
significant autonomy from the excessive interference of powerful social forces 
opposing teacher accountability.  
4.3 Greater Bureaucratic Autonomy  
 
Through its strategies of consensus-building and reputation-building the 
bureaucracy has gained considerable autonomy in managing its own affairs, 
which includes ensuring teacher accountability. This section describes these two 
strategies in detail.  
                                                                                                                                                        
48 Information provided by H.D. Kote’s Block Resource Center on February 24, 2015.  
62 
 
4.3.1 Bureaucratic Strategy of Consensus-Building  
There exists a consensus amongst education officials and teachers in 
K.R. Nagara about how an “ideal” teacher should perform. I observed how this 
consensus of accountability and performance binds the various levels of the 
block’s education department (i.e. education officials, Head Masters and 
teachers), insulating them from the clientelist pressures of the wider political 
system. The discussion that follows demonstrates the processes by which this 
consensus has been built.  
The basis of this consensus is exemplified through the identification and 
utilisation of better performing teachers as role models. According to education 
officials, good teachers in K.R. Nagara are identified, honoured at events and 
used as resource persons in workshops, whereby they share their experiences, 
challenges and the solutions to these challenges (focus group discussion with 
education officials, February 2, 2015). A prominent NGO in Mysore, SVYM, 
used K.R Nagara in addition to two other blocks (Mysore Rural and T. 
Nasipura) as a pilot for its School Leadership Development Programme in 
201349. The Project Completion Report (Vivekananda Institution for Leadership 
Development, 2014, pp.34-35), highlighted the use of model teachers in K.R. 
Nagara and found these teachers to be: 
…emotionally wise, good with people, humble, did not indulge in lending 
or borrowing, transparent in their dealings , exhibit consistent behaviours, 
were from financially sound families, had the support of their families, went 
home right after work and managed their time very well. 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 Shared by various K.R. Nagara Education Officials in interviews dated February 2, 2015. 
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Apart from being honoured and admired for their performance, the other 
incentive of being identified as a model teacher by senior education officials is 
that of participating in regular discussions with officials so as to provide 
feedback and suggestions. In addition, these model teachers accompany 
education officials on their school inspections and evaluation of other teachers.   
Selecting role models from within the block has made it easier for other 
teachers, operating within a similar context, to emulate them. The frequent 
interaction of role model teachers with the other teachers at workshops and 
school inspections has resulted in “healthy competition” amongst teachers. It is 
common to hear teachers in their conversations expressing the desire to be like 
a particular role model teacher. The consistent use of role models by the 
education officials has thereby established a clear picture of what is expected of 
teachers within the block.  
Teachers who deviate from the standard are brought back strategically to the 
fold. In their interactions with erring teachers, the education officials of K.R. 
Nagara are known to demonstrate respect and sensitivity. According to one of 
the Education Coordinators (personal communication, February 16, 2015):  
Teachers need good suggestions, good words from us. So if we speak to 
them in a good manner definitely they will be motivated….if we scold them, 
they will go a different way. If you respect them, they in return will also do. 
If we scold in a good way, they will take it in a good manner and go in the 
right path. 
Likewise the Block Resource Coordinator commented that education officials 
in K.R. Nagara are aware of what teachers expect and have understood the 
process of giving feedback and supervising teachers (personal communication, 
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February 16, 2015). According to him, it was important that “education officials 
demonstrate good behaviour…so that they (teachers) may not find anything 
wrong and deviate from their routine work”. To ensure that such awareness and 
understanding is held by all ranks of the bureaucracy, senior education officials 
orientate their subordinates regularly. In addition, the same respect and 
sensitivity accorded to teachers is also accorded to subordinates in their 
interactions with senior education officials within the block. 
 The department has to take initiative to train and orient them (Cluster 
Resource Persons) often. In K.R. Nagara, we have conducted workshops to 
make them understand all the programmes being implemented. The whole 
day is spent discussing the curriculum, how best to monitor, supervise, 
evaluate and provide feedback to teachers. We discuss these thoroughly. 
(Block Resource Person, personal communication, February 16, 2015). 
It is not necessary for a teacher to prepare the required administrative 
information at school hours. If the teacher is good, he is knowledgeable in 
what he does, he will prepare the information after school hours taking 
only 10 to 15 minutes and submit it. We do not call even a single head 
teacher to the block head-quarters as we collect information through 
Cluster Resource Persons only…….we have that kind of perfect sense that 
the teacher and Head Master should not be distracted from teaching. We 
maintain that strictly…Likewise, we do not call for meetings with Cluster 
Resource Persons often for we do not want to disturb them. They are 
supposed to go to schools and monitor things, guide teachers on what is 
expected of them......they should be able to carry this information and to 
make the teachers convinced… we communicate these effectively to them. 





In interviews with head masters, teachers and SDMC members in K.R. 
Nagara, I found this respect and understanding mutual and a result of their 
personal interactions with education officials. As illustrated in the previous 
section, teachers and Head Masters commented how Cluster Resource Persons 
provide good suggestions and feedback while on their school visits. SDMC 
members and teachers also expressed a firm belief that education officials will 
surely address issues or challenges their respective schools face. For example 
Teacher B in School 3 mentioned as follows (personal communication, 
September 18, 2014):  
We were struggling with one teacher short in this school. The Cluster 
Resource Person and Education Coordinator immediately reported the 
situation to the Block Education Officer and asked him to depute an 
additional teacher. The Block Education Officer called the school, noted 
the problem in his diary and solved it. If any teacher, told his or her 
problem by phone, he will note it in his diary and solve it.   
Another example that demonstrates how this respect for officials extends 
beyond the teachers to the community is the response of this SDMC Member of 
School 1 (though not related to issues of teacher accountability): 
As the school’s enrolment increased, we needed another cook and we 
called a meeting for that. When we told the Cluster Resource Person of our 
problem, he selected one from the village…they (education officials) are 
doing well. If we ask for anything they will do. (SDMC Member A, personal 
communication, September 17, 2014). 
Respect and sensitivity may be used preferably by education officials in 
addressing issues of teacher accountability amongst the rank and file of the 
department. But as illustrated in the previous section, senior education officials 
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are willing to take stern disciplinary action against those who consistently 
deviate from the rules. For example, the Block Education Office issued 28 show 
cause notices the previous year, mostly to teachers who were absent without 
consent for long durations.  
We will take disciplinary action against non performing teachers. But 
before doing that, we will call them and give them suggestions and go 
through the Karnataka Civil Service Rules. (Block Education Officer, 
personal communication, February 16, 2015) 
It is through the process of establishing acceptable standards via the use of 
role model teachers and getting others to willingly adhere to them through 
mutual respect and sensitivity that a consensus has been built around teacher 
accountability.  
4.3.2 Bureaucratic Strategy of Reputation-Building 
Such a consensus amongst education officials and teachers alone is 
insufficient to protect the bureaucracy’s relatively autonomous position against 
the preferences of politicians and organised interests. Therefore, in K.R. Nagara, 
bureaucratic strategies of consensus-building are accompanied by strategies that 
build and maintain the bureaucracy’s reputation amongst the block’s politicians 
and teacher association representatives50. Having a reputation of being 
transparent, efficient and unbiased in its operations, local politicians and the 
teacher association representatives usually refrain from encumbering the 
bureaucracy, unless required. This, in turn, has provided the bureaucracy with 
                                                                                                                                                        




significant operational latitude and support in ensuring teacher accountability 
and performance.  
If something is wrong, then only they (Primary School Teachers 
Association) will complain, interfere or cause a disturbance. If there is 
nothing wrong, nobody can question us. (Block Education Officer, 
personal communication, February 16, 2015) 
There is an understanding amongst education officials that if the salaries of 
teachers and other emoluments are provided efficiently, there will be minimal 
interference by the block’s primary teachers’ association. There, however, have 
been times of inefficiency forcing the association to step in. According to the 
block’s Primary School Teacher Association President (personal 
communication, February 16, 2015): 
There are clerks within the block education office that do not attend to the 
problems of teachers well….yearly increments, medical allowances and 
reimbursements. So we complain to the officers and ask them to solve those 
problems. 
The association is not met with resistance or suspicion by education officials. 
Rather the problems raised by the association are listened to by these officials 
sympathetically and if it is in their control, efforts are made to solve them. As 
an Education Coordinator shared confidently ‘we are all teachers and because 
of this serious problems will not arise’ (personal communication, February 16, 
2015). Education officials ensure that the association is honoured at events so 
as to avoid any issues of ‘prestige’. They also seek the assistance of the 
association in cases where teachers are behaving badly. In such situations, the 
association is known to provide suggestions and advice on how best to proceed. 
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The Primary School Teacher Association’s President corroborates their 
constructive involvement (personal communication, February 16, 2015): 
First the education officials (Cluster Resource Persons and Education 
Coordinators) should go there and solve the problem. If they are unable to, 
I and the Block Education Officer will go. For example, some teachers had 
been quarrelling with each other outside a school. The surrounding 
community saw this and demanded to the education officials that the school 
be closed and the teachers transferred. Then, the Block Education Officer 
and I talked with the teachers and eased the situation. Together with the 
teachers, I apologised to the community, assuring them that this won’t 
happen again and asked for their cooperation. 
The respect accorded to the association, the genuine efforts made by education 
officials to address the issues raised by them and the open communication that 
exists between the bureaucracy and association have all contributed the 
association’s sense of security with the bureaucracy. Therefore, there is little 
need for the association to exert undue influence or control over the bureaucracy 
with respect to the management of teachers.  
Likewise, education officials try to ensure that there is neither a need for 
elected leadership or politicians to influence nor assert their power over the 
bureaucracy. To avoid issues of “prestige”, the officials are well aware of which 
local politician has influence over which area in the block and invite him and 
his affiliates for events. In doing so, education officials have thereby gained 
support across all party lines. Having limited NGO involvement, they are able 
to source for funds from these alliances.  
However, such a strategy has its limitations and has been manipulated by 
the elected leadership with accusations of the bureaucracy not following 
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protocols or violating their privilege as elected leadership. I again refer to the 
case where a Block Education Officer was transferred out for inviting leadership 
from the ruling opposition rather than the elected MLA to inaugurate a mid-day 
meal kitchen.  The MLA justified his actions based on a violation of protocol 
(personal communication, September 21, 2014).  
The MLA, however, maintained that apart from this one instance he never 
interferes with the bureaucracy’s management of teachers. As the MLA 
blatantly put it, “there are only 3 things that have a permanent mark on voters - 
Health, Education and Food. Everything else is forgotten”. Therefore to him 
ensuring good quality education, good teachers and good infrastructure is 
electorally important and he supports the education bureaucracy financially in 
doing so. The education officials confirm this by asserting that the MLA 
supports education, not teachers or particular individuals (focus group 
discussion, February 12, 2015). It is therefore apparent that politicians in K.R. 
Nagara have begun to see it in their interest not to interfere with an efficient 
bureaucracy.  
Local politicians acknowledge the presence and proactiveness of education 
officials such that if there is a problem in a school in their respective areas (i.e. 
teacher scarcity or teacher dispute), these leaders call upon education officials 
to assist rather than taking matters into their own hands. The officials respond 
and try to address the issue so that there is no further interference. The education 
officers explain, that politicians have now begun to expect that education 
officers be punctual, clean handed, active and hard-working (focus group 
discussion, February 12, 2015).   
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The relationship between the bureaucracy and the political class that has 
developed over the years, as a result of these strategies, has provided the 
bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara significant operational latitude and support in 
ensuring teacher accountability. But as the next section will demonstrate, a 
strong nexus between the executive and the legislative arm of the state was 
required as the foundation for the above mention enlightened ways of 
functioning to be firmly rooted within the system.  
4.3.3 Presence of Political Backup  
 
In interviews with education officials in K.R. Nagara, I traced the first use 
of the strategies of consensus-building and reputation-building to an enlightened 
Block Education Officer who had the favour of the Karnataka’s Minister of 
Education, who was from K.R. Nagara.  This “political backup” enabled the 
Block Education Officer during his tenure (15/07/2000 to 03/03/2004) to reform 
bureaucratic operations within the block51.  An Education Coordinator in K.R. 
Nagara, who was a teacher then, explained (personal communication, February 
16, 2015): 
The system changed after his coming. He always encouraged us teachers 
but also punished so many. After him, there were other Block Education 
Officers but they did not want to change the system. They wanted 
continuity, as it was running smoothly. If it is a good system….why do they 
want to collapse it? 
Another Education Coordinator recalled how that Block Education Officer 
had faced lots of problems but was able to make a change with the support of 
Karnataka’s Education Minister. The official mentioned how the Block 
                                                                                                                                                        
51 The Minister of Education was from K.R. Nagara and had served in that position from the 
year 1999 to 2004.  
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Education Officer found teachers who were enthusiastic and sent them for 
training. He shared with me how he was one of those teachers (personal 
communication, February 16, 2015): 
He found me also. I was one of the few in the block to have a master’s 
degree in English. He identified me and sent me for English training at the 
district level. I then returned here and started training other teachers. He 
identified talent well. 
It is important to acknowledge that during this Block Education Officer’s tenure, 
the current in-service training opportunities and requirements under the nation-
wide education programmes, DPEP and SSA, were non-existent.  
In a separate interview, the block’s Primary School Teacher Association 
President shared how this Block Education Officer was disciplined and strict. 
He recalled how if the Block Education Officer saw any teacher walking the 
streets during school hours, he will note that teacher’s name in his diary and 
immediately visit the school and question the head master about what is being 
done about the attendance and will issue a notice to that teacher. As a result of 
such strong supervision, “all teachers behaved”, he says (personal 
communication, February 16, 2015).   A senior education official at the district 
level, who was once a Block Education Officer in K.R. Nagara and subsequently 
a Block Education Officer in H.D. Kote commented how doing so requires 
“political backup” (personal communication, February 21,2015) : 
Whenever you want to do some work the support is also needed. If you are 
to take objection or strong views against teachers the back-up is also 
important… 
Therefore, in K.R. Nagara, strong state capacity has resulted in teacher 
accountability within the constraints of clientelism. Its state capacity stems from 
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the bureaucratic strategies of consensus and reputation building. These gave the 
bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara the autonomy it required to ensure teacher 
accountability. But in order to initiate the process of becoming autonomous, the 
bureaucracy had to have the support of politically powerful leadership. 
This is similar to what Evan’s (1995) denotes as ‘embedded autonomy’ - a 
combination of Weberian bureaucratic isolation with an intense immersion into 
the surrounding social structure. In his work titled Embedded Autonomy: States 
and Industrial Transformation, Evans demonstrates how the relatively 
autonomous bureaucracies of East Asian countries still required the help of 
powerful groups within society to advance developmental policies. Likewise, 
Geddes (1994, pp. 49-50) in her book Politician's Dilemma: Building State 
Capacity in Latin America recognises that “bureaucrats need the protection from 
the politicians’ efforts to transform state resources into particularistic benefits 
for supporters in order to respond effectively to popular demands”.  She 
suggests that a “semipermeable membrane” that surrounds an insulated 
bureaucracy would protect its goals and organisational integrity but enable it to 
receive resources and information from society. 
Therefore the case of K.R. Nagara demonstrates the importance of the 
relationship between the politician and the enlightened bureaucrat in ensuring 
efficient public service delivery. For in isolation, the bureaucracy cannot 
succeed. The case of K.R. Nagara demonstrates that if we want to clearly 
understand why some governments perform better than others, a close 
examination into the relationship between the political executive and the 
bureaucracy is required.   
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5. H.D. KOTE 
 
When you talk about H.D. Kote and K.R.Nagara…...we expect H.D. Kote 
to be better since the DPEP started there and two NGOs have worked 
consistently there for the last 25 years. But what has happened? Even I 
don’t have a pucca (sure) answer for that. But I can definitely say that when 
political things come into the scenario and where the education system is 
completely driven by political people. The main essence or goal gets 
diluted. (Senior NGO Staff A, personal communication, February 24, 
2015)52 
No politics! You keep quiet (to the officer beside him)! Madam, someone 
has given you wrong information. H.D. Kote taluk is academically best. 
Please really (laughs). (Block Education Officer of H.D. Kote, personal 
communication, February 24, 2015) 
This chapter attributes the low levels of teacher accountability in H.D. Kote 
to weak state capacity. The education bureaucracy and elected leadership within 
H.D. Kote appear more interested in advancing their political or personal 
interests rather than quality education for all. In this chapter, I explain why the 
bureaucracy in H.D. Kote remains the ‘handmaiden’ of the political class, 
despite the vibrant and long standing presence of NGOs within the block53. 
5.1 Low-Levels of Teacher Accountability 
H.D. Kote has 306 government-run primary schools and 1274 government 
primary school teachers (DIET Mysore, 2014). Amongst the nine educational 
blocks in Mysore, H.D. Kote attained the lowest score for both learning 
                                                                                                                                                        
52 I greatly benefited from discussions with this senior NGO staff who has over 10 years of 
experience of working on education in H.D. Kote.  
53 The term ‘handmaiden’ is used by Marx (1848) to describe the state. The state, in his view, is 
a tool (instrument) of the capitalist class. The state, thereby, fulfils the needs, wants and desires 
of that class.  
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environment and leadership in the KSQAAC assessment of 54.64 and 61.0 
percent respectively (see Table 3 on p.37). The block, therefore, demonstrates 
low levels of teacher accountability. I visited 3 schools within H.D. Kote 
(Schools 4, 5 and 6) to corroborate the KSQAAC assessment with actual 
observations.   
In 2 out of the 3 schools visited, I found teachers arriving late and leaving 
early from school.  This is in contrast to what I observed in K.R. Nagara.  In 
K.R. Nagara, all teachers were present in the schools visited and apart from the 
Head Master facilitating my visit, the rest of the teachers were actively engaged 
with the students. 
In School 4, in H.D. Kote, 9 teachers and 1 Head Master had been officially 
deputed.  However, on my visits, I observed that there were only 5 teachers and 
the Head Master present. The teachers present were not engaged in class. They 
were either out of the class chatting with other teachers or sitting by the side of 
the classroom doing their own work. Students were observed walking in and out 
of the classroom. During curriculum time, some students were seen running 
along the corridors and cleaning the school compound (see Appendix 4 for more 
details on the performance of School 4).  
 In School 5, I found only 7 teachers present. There was supposed to be 9 
teachers there. Since the post of the Head Master had been vacant for 2 years, 
the senior most teachers of the school took turns to be the teacher-in-charge.  
Some of the teachers were observed arriving to the school late, others though 
present were not actively engaged in teaching. In addition, the quality of the 
infrastructure available at the school was poor and underutilised (see Appendix 
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5 for further elaboration on the quality of schooling provided in School 5). This 
despite the school having additional finances, amounting to around Rs. 18, 000 
a year, from leasing the additional land it owns. All schools receive standard 
grants from the Department of Education - Rs. 10, 000 (School Development 
Grant) and Rs. 20, 000 (School Maintenance Grant)54.   Two of the school’s 
SDMC members commented as follows: 
There are a lot of repairs to be done in the school buildings. Some people 
are interested and some are least bit bothered. The teacher-in-charge has 
changed so many times. It seems a new head master will be appointed again 
on September 23rd. The current teacher-in-charge is the third one for this 
year. Due to this there is mismanagement of the funds in the account. 
(SDMC member B, personal communication, September 21, 2014) 
When I complained about the motor problem, he (the teacher-in-charge) 
told me that he will lodge a complaint to the higher authorities. I am not 
sure if he is reporting the problems to the concerned authorities because 
no action has been taken yet….If I tell you or anybody, it will just become 
an issue. So the people just go on with whatever is happening. (SDMC 
member C, personal communication, September 21, 2014) 
In both Schools 4 and 5, SDMCs were formed but they remained largely 
dysfunctional. The SDMC meeting minutes of School 5 were not recorded at 
the SDMC meetings. In our presence, the teacher - in-charge wrote the minutes 
of the previous meeting, held two weeks ago and got the SDMC members 
present to sign it. It did not matter if these members attended that meeting or 
not. Likewise the SDMC of School 4 comprised of a select few of socially and 
politically powerful individuals from the village (i.e. the SDMC president, 
                                                                                                                                                        
54 The grants vary depending if the school is lower primary and/or higher primary and the 
number of class rooms within the school. See http://ssakarnataka.gov.in/html/int_grants.html 
for more details on the type of grants provided to government-run primary schools. 
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Gram Panchayat President and Secretary). This is in contrast to K.R. Nagara, 
whereby the SDMCs were formed as per the guidelines and functioning well. 
This was evident from the detailed minutes recorded and signed after the 
SDMCs’ monthly meetings in each of the schools.  
Compared to Schools 4 and 5, School 6 in H.D. Kote however performed 
relatively well. The drastic difference in the performance of these schools can 
be attributed to the absence of strong supervisory and monitory mechanisms 
within the block.   
The buildings and classrooms in School 6 were well maintained and the 
SDMC vibrant and functioning well. 5 teachers had been deputed to the school. 
On both visits, I found all teachers present and apart from the teacher-in-charge, 
all other teachers were actively engaged in the classroom.  Since the post of the 
Head Master was vacant for the last 2 years, the senior most teacher became the 
teacher -in-charge. His office had 3 computers, a colour printer and a laptop for 
administrative use. With funds from the community, the teacher-in-charge had 
a speaker system installed throughout the school (see Appendix 6 for more 
detailed description of the school’s performance). 
The apparent differences among the three schools in H.D. Kote (Schools 4, 
5 and 6) can be attributed to the strong influence of what Vasavi and 
Mukhopadhyay (2008) term as the “HM effect”.  HM is their abbreviated form 
for Head Master. The HM effect occurs when the functioning of a school is 
defined by the Head Master who runs it. They argue that the extent to which the 
performance of a school is defined by the Head Master, depends on the 
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Department of Education’s ability to implement rules and processes that ensure 
the accountable functioning of schools. 
Based on their study in Chamarajanagar, a district adjacent to Mysore, they 
observe how in the absence of strong supervisory and monitory mechanisms, 
schools function not as rule-based institutions but on the commitment level of 
various types of Head Masters55. Dedicated Head Masters develop and sustain 
good schools despite the structural problems that affect them (i.e. burden of 
administration, teacher shortage or inadequate infrastructure). But Head 
Masters who lack interest and commitment “ruin” the performance of schools 
instead.  
The differential performance of schools in H.D. Kote, thereby, indicates the 
absence of strong supervisory and monitory mechanisms within the block. This 
I found to be true in my interviews with teachers, SDMC members and 
education officials in H.D. Kote. The weak capacity of the state in H.D. Kote in 
ensuring teacher accountability, permits underperforming Head Masters and 
teachers to function without accountability and dedicated Head Masters and 
teachers to go without recognition or support. The next section demonstrates 
H.D. Kote’s weak state capacity in ensuring teacher accountability. 
5.2 Weak State Capacity 
The education bureaucracy in H.D. Kote conducts mandatory in-service 
trainings or monthly meetings for teachers. But, since most of the education 
                                                                                                                                                        
55 In 1998, Chamarajnagar was carved out of the then much larger district of Mysore. The current 
Block Education Officer of H.D. Kote was Block Education Offier in Chamarajnagar before 
occupying his current post of Block Education Officer in H.D. Kote. 
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officials in the block seldom visit schools, they fail to ensure that the knowledge 
imparted at these trainings and meetings are implemented effectively within the 
classroom.   
The teachers interviewed in H.D. Kote were all uncertain about the number of 
times officials visited and inspected their respective schools. They shared how 
Cluster Resource Persons usually called teachers to them instead of visiting 
schools. Likewise, most of the SDMC members interviewed could not recall 
interacting with their respective school’s Cluster Resource Person on a personal 
basis when he/she visited the school. The SDMC members of School 5, for 
example, did not even know that the Cluster Resource Center was located within 
their school grounds.   
This was in contrast to K.R. Nagara, where the teachers and SDMC members 
shared that their schools were visited by their respective Cluster Resource 
Persons every month in the previous academic year. SDMC members were also 
able to describe clearly what the Cluster Resource Persons’ did on their school 
visits. For example an SDMC Member B of School 2 in K.R. Nagara shared: 
Education officials check the quality of education and the relationship of 
teachers with the community. The SDMC members are called and the 
inspector speaks with them. (Personal communication, September 20, 
2014) 
However, teachers in H.D. Kote described how officials visited their 
schools mainly for administrative purposes (i.e. data collection, teacher shortage 
and infrastructural challenges)56. Their responses were markedly different from 
                                                                                                                                                        




that of the teachers in K.R. Nagara. Teachers in K.R. Nagara shared 
enthusiastically how officials on their school visits sat in their classrooms, 
observed their teaching techniques and even conducted model lessons.  
5.3 Lesser Bureaucratic Autonomy 
 
It became apparent that the weak state capacity witnessed in H.D. Kote was 
a result of low bureaucratic autonomy. Compared to the bureaucracy in K.R. 
Nagara, the bureaucracy in H.D. Kote appears to be significantly less insulated 
from the clientelist tendencies of the wider political system. As particular parties 
and caste communities strive to gain greater control of the administration in 
H.D. Kote, positions within the bureaucracy remain highly politicised.  I found 
evidence which suggested that the bureaucracy in H.D. Kote is functioning more 
in terms of advancing political or personal interests rather than quality education 
for all.  
The post of Block Education Officer in H.D. Kote is a politically decided 
one, as it is in K.R. Nagara. Teachers and NGO staff interviewed firmly attest 
that the Block Education Officer is the “right hand person” or a “favourite” of 
political leadership. But unlike K.R. Nagara, the post of the Block Education 
Officer in H.D. Kote is marked by great instability, since officials are transferred 






Table 10. Block Education Officer Caste and Duration of Tenure 
(H.D. Kote) 
SN. Duration (dd/mm/yyyy) Caste 
1 07/06/1995 to 16/08/1995 (2 months 9 days) Lingayat 
2 21/08/1995 to 28/02/2003 (6 years 6 months 7 days) Schedule 
Caste 
3 01/03/2003 to 28/03/2003 (27 days) Schedule 
Caste  
4 28/03/2003 to 18/01/2004 (9 months 21 days) Vokkaliga 
5 19/01/2004 to 06/09/2004 (7 months 18 days) Backward 
Caste 
6 06/09/2004 to 23/04/2007 (2 years 7 months 17 days) Muslim 
7 24/04/2007 to 22/07/2009 (2 years 2 months 28 days) Lingayat 
8 22/07/2009 to 29/10/2009 (3 months 7 days) Backward 
Caste 
9 30/10/2009 to 17/07/2010 (8 months17 days) Vokkaliga 
10 17/07/2010 to 06/07/2011 (11 months 19 days) Lingayat 
11 06/07/2011 to 21/10/2013 (2 years3 months15days)  Schedule 
Tribe 
12 21/10/2013 to Present Schedule 
Caste 
(Source: Block Education Office in H.D. Kote).  
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In 2014, amendments to the Karnataka Education Act, 1995, fixed the 
tenure of Block Education Officials at their place of posting to 3 years57. Prior 
to this, officials could occupy the post permanently or for many years. In KR. 
Nagara most of the Block Education Officers have remained in their post for 
around 2 to 3 years (see Table 9 on p.56). However in H.D. Kote, as seen in 
Table 10 above, most of the Block Education Officers have remained in their 
post for less than a year before being transferred out. According to an education 
official in H.D. Kote (focus group discussion, February 24, 2015): 
It should not happen. If an officer is appointed here, he has to study our 
whole block, the teachers and the quality of education.  It takes time. But 
as soon as an officer is settled here, he/she is immediately transferred.   
I was informed by a senior education official at the district-level about how 
she had to leave her position as a Block Education Officer in H.D. Kote because 
another political party had come to power in the state government. She, a 
Vokkaliga, was quickly replaced by an officer of the Lingayat caste who 
received the support of the newly elected Chief Minister, who was also a 
Lingayat.  “It’s a political game” she says (personal communication, February 
21, 2015). 
In H.D. Kote, politicians are known to harass senior officials to obtain 
favourable postings for officers of their choice, even to other administrative 
departments. In an article published by The Hindu, in 2012, the head of the 
District Urban Development Cell accused the MLA of H.D. Kote for calling her 
                                                                                                                                                        
57 An article in the Hindu describes how it was an attempt on the part of the Government of 
Karnataka to “clean the department of primary and secondary education”(Khajane, 2014).  In 




20 to 30 times a day so that she will post officers of his choice. Even though it 
was the Deputy Commissioner who preceded over the postings and not her, she 
and her staff were “tormented” by the MLA (“Sparks fly thick and fast between 
MLA and official”, 2012).  
I found that there existed a strong bond between the senior education officials 
of the block and elected political leadership. But unlike in K.R. Nagara, this 
bond did not advance greater accountability and efficiency within the system. 
Rather it served to protect the personal and political interest of the 
administrative and executive arms of the state. The following example 
illustrates this clearly.  
A Project Site Visit Report by ASHA for Education (2006, p. 2) on 
Shikshanavahini, the project implemented by SVYM to strengthen SDMCs in 
H.D. Kote, describes how at a block-level SDMC Federation meeting, the 
SDMC representatives present attributed the irregular transfer of teachers to the 
Block Education Officer and the MLA. They decided to meet the MLA and the 
Block Education Officer respectively to voice their concern. According to the 
Report, despite prior confirmation of the meeting, it was only after a “protracted 
struggle” that the forty SDMC representatives were able to meet the MLA. 
When they finally presented their concern to him, the Report described the 
MLA’s response as “defensive and defiant”. After a heated argument, the MLA 
referred the SDMC representatives to the Block Education Officer and 
accompanied them to the Block Education Office. The SDMC representatives 
then raised their concern to the Block Education Officer, who in turn responded 
in a “nonchalant” and “irresponsible” manner. This led to another round of 
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heated accusations, with the Block Education Officer and MLA siding each 
other. The Report describes how the SDMC representatives eventually lost hope 
and began to leave once the response from the Block Education Official and the 
MLA became more reckless. 
Within H.D. Kote, I found evidence to suggest that even the position of the 
Cluster Resource Person is politicised. Private school teachers who were once 
government school teachers shared how most Cluster Resource Persons and 
Block Resource Persons act as nodal points in mobilising local support for 
political leaders (focus group discussion with private school teachers and senior 
NGO staff, February 24, 2015).  All teachers aspiring to become Cluster 
Resource Persons or Block Resource Persons have to sit for a competitive exam 
at the district-level. There is however a strong conviction among these teachers 
that the process has been politicised.  
If a Block Education Officer wants a particular Cluster Resource Person, 
he can influence the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET) 
which is evaluating the exam script. He can call the person who’s 
evaluating and say my person is there you give him more marks. (Private 
School Teacher E, focus group discussion, February 24, 2015)  
The Cluster Resource Persons and Block Resource Persons in H.D. Kote 
are often viewed as being more preoccupied with retaining the support of the 
Block Education Officer by “singing his praises”, rather than visiting schools 
regularly. Two senior NGO staff in H.D. Kote, recalled how the current Minister 
of Education for Karnataka had come to H.D. Kote and complained about the 
poor performance of students at the 10th standard examinations. He called upon 
the education officials to ensure students improve, if not drastic changes will be 
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made in appointments. After the Minister of Education’s visit, the Block 
Education Officer presided over meeting whereby these two NGO staff were 
present. According to the NGO staff, the Block Education Officer subtly told 
the officials and teachers present to do whatever it takes to improve results “even 
if it means copying, to copy properly”(Senior NGO staff B, personal 
communication, February 26, 2015).  
The district-level official interviewed also shared an unpleasant encounter 
with the current Block Education Officer of H.D. Kote (personal 
communication, February 21, 2015). When sharing the findings of a teacher 
self-evaluation exercise that was conducted across all the blocks with the Block 
Education Officers, the Block Education Officer of H.D. Kote openly disputed 
the results, questioning its validity and authenticity.    
Despite the poor performance of its teachers and headmasters, in 2014, the 
Block Education Office of H.D. Kote only issued 8 show cause notices, while 
the Block Education Office in K.R. Nagara issued 28 the same year58.  I asked 
the Cluster Resource Persons and Block Resource Persons present at a focus 
group discussion in H.D. Kote if they were doing enough to ensure teacher 
accountability and performance within the block (February 24, 2015). Most of 
the officials present mentioned how they would like to do more. However they 
were restricted by the burden of administration (i.e. data collection and collation 
and the administration of various programmes like scholarships, distribution of 
books, uniforms and learning materials) and their short tenure in office.  
                                                                                                                                                        




A Cluster Resource Person described how it takes a year to comprehend 
what is happening before they can perform their duties well, and therefore, 3 
years in the post of Cluster Resource Person was insufficient. Voicing their 
limitations, some of the officials present suggested that Head Masters and more 
senior officials within the administration (i.e. the Education Coordinator and 
Block Resource Coordinator) should take more responsibility in ensuring 
teacher accountability and performance.  
It is important to note that the limitations raised by these H.D. Kote 
education officials above are structural. These structural limitations should also 
affect education officials within K.R. Nagara since both block-level 
bureaucracies are governed by the same administrative framework. But 
compared to H.D. Kote, the bureaucracy and its functionaries in K.R. Nagara 
appear less hindered by these structural limitations and more proactive in 
ensuring teacher accountability and performance, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.  
In K.R. Nagara, the education officials through strategies of consensus-
building and reputation-building fortify the bureaucracy against excessive 
interference or manipulation. Why are the education officials in H.D. Kote not 
able to do the same? I will attempt to answer the above question. A detailed 
investigation is, however, required to confirm the possible explanations raised 
in this section. 
5.3.1 Ideas within the State 
 
Through his interviews with state officials across India, Wiener (1991) 
reveals that it is the belief system of bureaucracy that is responsible for the low 
levels of literacy and school participation rates in India. As the belief system is 
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based on the social ordering of the caste system, children from lower castes 
backgrounds were deemed not entitled to quality education. This hierarchical 
view which was somewhat consensual and accepted by all in Indian society had 
influenced education policy. This explains the poor management of public 
schools in rural areas, as most of the children who attend these schools come 
from lower caste backgrounds.  
In a similar manner, when asked to account for the poor performance of 
H.D. Kote, most of the education officials, teachers and NGO staff interviewed 
by me in H.D. Kote, K.R. Nagara and Mysore responded that it is “majority SC 
and ST”. Education officials in H.D. Kote lamented how “it is too difficult to 
educate them (SCs and STs), to take them to the main stream” (Focus group 
discussion with education officials, February 24, 2015). According to Census of 
India 2011, the SC and ST population consists only 51 percent of the population. 
The remaining population in H.D. Kote includes members from the BC, GC and 
other minority communities like Muslims and Christians.  
This hierarchical view is reinforced by the continued declaration of H.D. 
Kote as a “backward” block. The D.M. Nanjundappa Committee Report on 
Regional Imbalances in 2002 ranked H.D. Kote among the most backward 
blocks in Karnataka (Government of Karnataka, 2002). Since 22 percent of K.R. 
Nagara’s population is SC and ST, perhaps the lax mentality of the bureaucracy 
in H.D. Kote towards ensuring teacher accountability and performance is a 
result of the hierarchical view as argued by Wiener (1991).  
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5.3.2 Absence of Political Back Up 
The difference in beliefs, or one could call ideas, does not guarantee that a 
bureaucracy situated in an area with significantly more upper castes is less prone 
to clientalism or better able to implement strategies to gain operational 
autonomy. In interviews with education officials in K.R. Nagara, I traced the 
first use of the strategies of consensus-building and reputation-building to an 
enlightened Block Education Officer who had the favour of the Karnataka’s 
Minister of Education, who was also from K.R. Nagara. It was the political 
backup that enabled this Block Education Officer during his tenure (15/07/2000 
to 03/03/2004) to reform bureaucratic operations within K.R. Nagara.   
The education officials in H.D. Kote believed such political backup is missing 
in their block. They deemed the block as “politically backward”. According to 
an education official there (focus group discussion, February 24, 2015): 
The faith of this block is as such…when a party forms the government, the 
opposition party member is MLA here. This is continuously happening. 
The lack of sound leadership and support within H.D. Kote could also be a result 
of its MLAs being non-residents of the block and in power for only a term. 
Political parties contesting this once SC, now ST reserved constituency, 
continue to field candidates from other blocks or districts. Therefore, without a 
stable electoral base, MLAs in H.D. Kote seldom stay in power for more than a 
term. This is unlike K.R. Nagara, where the elected leadership has always been 
a resident of the block and in power for more than a term. Further investigation 
is however required to conclude if the above assertions affect a bureaucracy’s 
inclination to become autonomous. 
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5.3.3 Nature of NGO Involvement 
 
Another area that requires further investigation is the role of NGOs in 
affecting a bureaucracy’s inclination to gain operational autonomy. When 
compared to K.R. Nagara, the case of H.D. Kote necessitates such an 
investigation. Without NGO assistance, the bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara, 
through its strategies of consensus and reputation building, demonstrates 
initiative and resourcefulness in attaining and maintaining operational 
autonomy. Despite years of active NGO involvement within the block, the 
bureaucracy in H.D. Kote has yet to demonstrate any concern or vigour in 
addressing the excessive political interference it faces. I found preliminary 
evidence to suggest that NGOs in H.D. Kote may instead be keeping the block’s 
incompetent bureaucracy afloat.  
Of all the NGOs, the efforts undertaken by SVYM and MYRADA in H.D. 
Kote are the most prominent. MYRADA has been working in the education 
sector of H.D. Kote since early 1980s and SVYM since mid-1990s. It is 
important to recognise that NGO involvement in H.D. Kote was vibrant even 
before the Indian government had made significant investment into the 
education sector with the DPEP and subsequently SSA programmes. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs helped schools across H.D. Kote 
construct compounds, procure toilets, waste disposal pits, computers and 
drinking water facilities and even hire teachers to alleviate the teacher shortage 
in schools.  
The intensive and extensive involvement of NGOs during the 1980s and 1990s, 
according to the founder and chairman of SVYM, Dr. R. Balasubramaniam, had 
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stifled bureaucratic initiative and community initiative (personal 
communication, February 12, 2015). This is because NGO efforts were neither 
bureaucratic driven or community driven. Referring to the bureaucracy of H.D. 
Kote, Executive Director of MYRADA, Mr. W. D’Souza expressed 
disappointment (personal communication, February 18, 2015):  
They knew we were doing all that. We said our focus was the children. 
Maybe that was our fault, for sustainability we should have prepared the 
state…..In fact, we tell them ‘we spoil you’ so many times. We are 
responsible. 
Dr. R. Balasubramaniam shared with me, that the years of NGO 
benevolence has resulted in villagers seeing any engagement with the state to 
improve the quality of education as pointless (personal communication, 
February 12, 2015). SVYM finds it hard to convince communities of the 
importance of the state in service delivery and the need for community 
empowerment to actively engage with the state. This was apparent in the long 
term impact of SVYM’s projects called Shikshanavahini, which aimed to 
mobilise community support for the active functioning of SMCs across schools 
in H.D. Kote. The NGO also established a SDMC Federation that collectively 
organised SDMCs at the block level. It was believed that, as a group, SMCs 
could more effectively pressurise education officials into taking action on 
various issues like the insufficient provision of teachers and the poor 
performance of teachers in the classroom (SVYM, 2007). 
The project only lasted for 4 years (2004-2008) and ended as there was no 
more funding. SDMCs soon reverted back to their previous state of 
dysfunctionality and the SDMC Federation remains largely powerless within 
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the block. This is probably because SDMC members change every 2 to 3 years. 
But more importantly, the project failed to involve education officials in the 
mobilising process so as to improve their capacity to relate and work better with 
SDMCs. Education officials were only approached when a school-related 
problem needed to be addressed.  
Likewise, I found that the NGOs present in H.D. Kote do not 
collaboratively work together. A strong pressure group that can collectively 
advise the bureaucracy or advocate against it is missing. NGOs such as SVYM 
now run their own private schools to fill the gap of quality education in the 
block. Mr W. D’Souza informed me how MYRADA, in response to the 
bureaucracy’s inaptitude, began to propagate and support the development of 
private schools within the block (personal communication, February 18, 2015).  
The nature of NGO involvement within H.D. Kote appears to have stifled 
bureaucratic initiative and produced a bureaucracy largely apathetic to working 
efficiently towards goals like teacher accountability and performance. This 
leaves room for powerful interest groups within society to capture and 
manipulate its functioning for personal or political gain. The situation described 
above is in contrast to the popular understanding that vibrant NGO involvement 
will lead to a more responsive bureaucracy and better developmental outcomes. 









Clientalism is the main challenge to teacher accountability in India. The political 
class gives particularistic benefits to teachers and education officials in return 
for their electoral support. These benefits include favourable transfers and 
promotions or protection from scrutiny. As a result erring teachers proceed 
undisciplined or unpunished owing to the protection received. Teachers with the 
hope of obtaining favourable transfers and promotions, spend most of their time 
cultivating relations with politicians rather than actively teaching in the 
classrooms.  
The presence of a strong civil society is depicted in the literature as key to 
driving such clientelistic tendencies away from the system, thus ensuring 
teacher accountability. The literature also maintains that here exists in 
abundance, instances whereby NGOs, local-level mediators and social 
movements have effectively challenged the strong interests involved in 
perpetuating low levels of teacher accountability. 
Paradoxically, after comparing two blocks in a district in the state of Karnataka, 
I ascertained that the block with greater civic action, H.D. Kote, had lower levels 
of teacher accountability whereas the block without significant civic action, 
K.R. Nagara, had higher levels of teacher accountability. This despite the 
apparent practice of clientelism in both blocks’ wider political systems. As civic 
action could not systematically account for the varied performance of these two 
blocks, I searched for an alternative explanation to teacher accountability within 
the constraints of clientelism. 
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 To do this, I invoked a method known as process tracing. I traced the processes 
by which teacher accountability was achieved more in K.R. Nagara and less in 
H.D. Kote. A combination of qualitative data collection methods were used to 
achieve this.  
Through a comparative analysis of K.R. Nagara and H.D. Kote, I found teacher 
accountability to be significantly influenced by state capacity. The ability of the 
state in both these blocks to effectively ensure teacher accountability in the face 
of social opposition (i.e. politicians and teachers’ unions interested in 
maintaining the low levels of teacher accountability for personal and political 
gain), depended on the bureaucracy and nature of its relationship with teachers 
and the political class.  
The bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara, through strategies of consensus-building and 
reputation-building, developed a strong and engaging relationship with teachers 
and the political class. As a result of this relationship the bureaucracy gained 
significant operational latitude and support to ensure teacher accountability. My 
findings within K.R. Nagara revealed that clientelism, in the presence of an 
enlightened bureaucracy, did not affect teacher accountability significantly.  
Therefore, K.R.Nagara bureaucracy’s proactiveness in ensuring teacher 
accountability within the constraints of clientelism goes against the predicted 
outcomes of clientelism. As the World Bank (2003) reports and scholars like 
Chandra (2004) argue, clientelism results in particularistic benefits to certain 
communities rather than programmatic benefits to all castes. But K.R. Nagara 
appears to be an exception, since its better performing government-run primary 
schools are attended by a significant portion of other caste communities.  
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In contrast, the bureaucracy in H.D. Kote was highly politicised and functioned 
more in terms of advancing political or personal interests rather than quality 
education for all. Senior education officials were transferred out ever so quickly 
by political leadership attempting to exert their control over the system. 
Moreover, officials at the lower rungs of the bureaucracy acted as nodal points 
in mobilising local support for the political class. The lack of credible leadership 
and bureaucratic laxity has led to low levels of teacher accountability in H.D. 
Kote which led to poor performing schools. 
The presence of NGOs in H.D. Kote did not really help improve levels of 
teacher accountability. Despite years of active NGO involvement within the 
block, which literature says would make the bureaucracy in H.D. Kote more 
responsive, I found instead that NGO involvement actually contributed to 
stifling bureaucratic initiative and producing a bureaucracy largely apathetic to 
working efficiently towards goals like teacher accountability. This is in contrast 
to the popular understanding that vibrant NGO involvement will lead to a more 
responsive bureaucracy and better developmental outcomes. These findings 
provoke one to think more carefully about the role of Indian civil society in 
governance.  
The lax mentality of the bureaucracy in H.D. Kote towards ensuring teacher 
accountability could also be a result of the hierarchical view held by the state 
towards H.D. Kote’s predominantly Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe 
population. This view has been reinforced by the continued declaration of H.D. 
Kote as a ‘backward’ block. More importantly, I found the bureaucracy in H.D. 
Kote to be less inclined to becoming autonomous because it lacked the ‘political 
back up’ that was present in K.R. Nagara. It was the ‘political’ backup in K.R. 
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Nagara, more specifically the strong nexus between the executive and the 
legislative arm of the state that the enabled the bureaucracy in K.R. Nagara to 
implement strategies that effectively challenged the strong interests involved in 
perpetuating low levels of teacher accountability.  
The findings from this dissertation are just the tip of a largely submerged 
iceberg.  This dissertation provides a nuanced descriptive analysis of an 
important subject that remains not addressed by the literature on teacher 
accountability in India — the vital role bureaucracies and their functionaries 
play in ensuring teacher accountability, within the constraints of clientelism. I 
have demonstrated this by revealing in this dissertation the strategies by which 
one block-level bureaucracy gains its operational latitude and support so as to 
ensure teacher accountability whereas the other fails dismally to do so.  
However, this dissertation had to be based only on two blocks owing insufficient 
time and latitude given for it, its key findings should be further tested on a much 
larger selection of cases. Only then could a conclusion be arrived at to reveal 
that its findings can indeed apply to whole of India.  
In addition, the other major limitation of this dissertation, is the difficulty in 
collecting data to ascertain the extent of clientelism within each block. 
Capturing the individualistic exchange of public services for political support 
directly would require an intense amount of field work. This is a problem faced 
by other comparative scholars working on clientelism. Hikens (2011, p. 304) 
highlights that researchers, as a result, used a variety of proxies to measure 
clientalism. Weitz-Shapiro (2014, pp.80-81) notes how by comparing the 
spending government on different types of goods and services, clientelism is 
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indirectly measured. In this dissertation, however, I relied on secondary sources 
(i.e. newspapers and interviews) to ascertain the extent of clientelism present in 
the education sector as well as the wider political systems of these blocks. More 
methods are however required for a more accurate comparison of cases. 
But despite this limitation, this dissertation demonstrates the value bureaucratic 
strategies like consensus-building and reputation-building can have by 
insulating the state from excessive political interference, providing it with the 
capacity to ensure teacher accountability. Therefore, instead of the constant 
advocacy for policy change and greater initiatives to strengthen civic action, 
there needs to be greater effort spent on conditioning and informing 
bureaucracies and their functionaries, especially at the district and sub-district 
level, of the possible strategies they can use to successfully navigate the 
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Appendix 1:  Profile and Performance of School 1 




Total enrolment was 42. 
Single caste (BCs). Many 
of the children have come 
from nearby villages. 
Has 4 classrooms, 1 
separate room for the 
Head Master and 
library and 1 mid-
day meal kitchen. All 
rooms are in pucca 
condition. Separate 
toilets for girls and 
boys. School has 
electricity, 1 hand 
pump and 1 
computer. Also has a 
garden and compost 
pit. Furniture 
available for all 
students. 
SDMC was formed after 
consultation with the 
parents of school going 
children and members of 
the community. 50 percent 
of SDMC members are 
female. Meetings are held 
regularly, once a month. 
Usual attendance is 12-13 
members. Detailed minutes 
are recorded at each 
meeting and signed 
thereafter by those present. 
Monetary contributions 
have been made by 
members to purchase 
benches for the children to 
have their mid-day meals 
on and for the celebration 
of festivities. SDMC 
members have approached 
the Block Education 
Officer for the construction 
of a playground. 
3 teachers have been 
deputed to the school (all 3 
were present on both days of 
field visit).  Each has 16 to 
18 years of experience.  2 
are BCs (i.e. Vokkaliga and 
Viswakarma) and 1 is GC 
(i.e. Lingayat). 2 of the 
teachers hail from K.R. 
Nagar while one hails from 
another district, Tumkur. 
Except for the most senior 
teacher, the other teachers 
were engaged in class. This 
school does not have a Head 
Master as its enrolment is 
less than 60 students (in 
accordance to government 
orders). 
School was visited 12 times by 
the Cluster Resource Person and 
3 times by the Block Resource 
Person. Block Education Officer 
had visited the school 2 times. 
Cluster Resource Person 
conducted training for SDMC 
members at the Cluster 
Resource Center. Majority of 
the SDMC member recall 
having interacted with the 
Cluster Resource Person on a 




Classes I to V 
5 km from Cluster 
Resource Center 
(Source: Data collected by author.) 
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Total enrolment was 
155.  31 percent of the 
students are BCs, 44 
percent STs,  19 
percent SCs and 6 
percent GCs. 
6 classrooms. 2 rooms were 
locked for repair. 1 separate 
room for the Head Master 
and 1 separate room for the 
library. 1 of the classrooms 
has 7 computers.  1 Mid-day 
meal kitchen. Separate 
toilets for boys and girls.   
The school has its own 
garden. There are gaps in the 
boundary wall so that the 
public can access the well in 
the school compound. The 
well has been temporarily 
covered with an iron mash, 
after 2 incidents of suicide.  
The GP has refused to seal it 
completely as it remains a 
source of water for the 
village. This despite the 
concerns raised by the Head 
Master, teachers and CRP on 
the children's safety.  
 
SDMC was formed after 
consultation with the 
parents of school going 
children and members of 
the community. 50 
percent of its members 
are female. Monthly 
meetings are held. Only 
6-8 members participate. 
Minutes are recorded in 
detail at each meeting 
and signed thereafter by 
those present.  
5 teachers and 1 Head Master 
have been deputed to the school 
(all 6 were present at the time of 
both the field visits).  The Head 
Master has 33 years of 
experience, another senior 
teacher 23 years and the rest of 
the teachers had between 11-18 
years of experience.  The Head 
Master hails from another 
district, Mandya. The senior 
teacher from Mysore city and 
the rest of the teachers are from 
nearby villages in KR Nagar. 
The Head Master and four of 
the teachers are GC (i.e. 
Vaishava, Brahmin, Lingayat 
Achari). There was only 1 BC 
teacher (i.e. Vokkaliga). Except 
for the HM and senior teacher, 
who was with me during both 
field visits, all other teachers 
remain in class teaching.  
 
School was visited 14 times 
by the Cluster Resource 
Coordinator, 3 times by the 
Block Resource Person and 
2 times the Block Education 
Officer. About 6 to 8 SDMC 
members attended the 
annual trainings conducted 
by the Cluster Resource 
Person with Head Master.  
SDMC member interviewed 
recalled having interacted 
with the Cluster Resource 
Person on a personal basis 




Classes I to VIII 
3 km from Cluster 
Resource Center 




Appendix 3: Profile and Performance of School 3 
 
School Description Enrolment 2013-2014 Building SDMC Teachers Interaction with Education 
Officials 2013-2013 
HPS in village 3  Total Enrolment  was 73.  63 
percent of the students are 
SCs and 37 percent BCs. 
Most children in the village 
are enrolled in private schools 
in the town.  
 6 classrooms. 1 separate 
room for the Head Master 
and library and 1 mid-day 
meal kitchen. 5 of the 
classrooms are in pucca 
condition. 1 needs major 
repairs and is locked. 
Separate toilets for girls 
and boys. School has 
electricity 1 hand pump 









Slightly over 50 
percent of its 
members are 
female. Monthly 






are recorded at 
each meeting and 
signed by those 
present.  
4 teacher and 1 Head 
Master have been 
deputed to the school. 
3 teachers and the 
head master were BCs 
and 1 teacher was GC. 
The head master had 
30 years of 
experience.  And the 
teachers had 9 to 15 
years of experience 
Apart from the Head 
Master and another 
teacher facilitating my 
visit, the other three 
teachers were actively 
engaged in the 
classroom.   
 
 
School was visited 12 times by the 
Cluster Resource Person, 3 times 
by the Block Resource Person and 
the Block Education Officer has 
visited the school 1 time. Cluster 
Resource Person had conducted 
training for SDMC members at 
Cluster Resource Center. They 
were accompanied by the Head 




Classes I to VII 
3 km fromCluster 
Resource Center 
 














Total enrolment is 
337. 64 percent of 
the students are 
SCs, 16 percent 
STs, 18 percent 
BCs and 2 percent 
GCs. 
7 classrooms. 1 
separate room for the 
Head Master and 
Library. 1 computer 
room with 5 
computers. Out of the 7 
classrooms, 4 are pucca 
and 3 requiring minor 
repair. 1 mid-day meal 
kitchen. Separate 
toilets for boys and 
girls. To get to the 
toilets, however, 
students one by one 
had to cross a narrow 
pathway alongside a 
large pit. At the time of 
the author's 
unannounced visit, a 
student had been 
instructed by the Head 
Master to tie a rope 
alongside the edge of 
the pit. 
The SDMC comprised of a select few 
of socially and politically powerful 
individuals from the village (i.e. the 
SDMC president, Gram Panchayat 
president and secretary). Only 30 
percent of its members were female. 
Meetings are conducted irregularly.  
The author was only able to interview 
the SDMC president as the Head 
Master declined on calling the other 
members. The author believes to have 
identified financial irregularities in the 
spending. According to GP records the 
construction of the gate at the entrance 
of the school cost Rs. 9100. And Rs. 
9300 was utilised for the purchase of 
wooden 'equipment' for the school.  
When questioned, the SDMC president 
said the wooden 'equipment' meant 
wooden furniture for the classroom. 
When approached to clarify the costs, 
a senior educational official within the 
block commented that it should not 
have cost that much.  
9 teachers and 1 Head Master have 
been deputed to the school.  However 
there were only 5 teachers and the 
Head Master present at the school 
during the author's first visit and 6 
teachers and the Head Master during 
the author's second visit.  The author 
was only able to collect the caste 
composition of the teachers and Head 
Master in the second visit. The Head 
Master and 2 teachers were SC, 2 of 
the teachers were ST and 2 GCs. At 
time of visit, teachers though present 
were not engaged in class. They were 
either out of the class chatting with 
other teachers or sitting by the side of 
the classroom perusing their own 
work.  Children were poorly behaved, 
Despite the presence of a teacher in 
the classroom, students were observed 
walking out of the classroom as and 
when they wished. There were 
students running along the corridors, 
some pending more time cleaning the 
school grounds rather than being in 
the classroom.   
The Head Master and 
teachers were 
uncertain about 
number of times the 
Cluster Resource 
Person, Block 
Resource Person and 
Block Education 
Officer visited the 
school. Teachers and 
Head Masters gave 
different responses. 
There were no 
records within the 
school to prove that 
these officials had 
visited.   
Co-educational 
Classes I to VII 
*In the previous 
year there was 
till class VIII. 
But it was 
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School Description Enrolment 
(2013-2014) 





is 226. 40 percent 
are SCs, 56 
percent STs and 4 
percent BCs.  
10 classrooms. 1 room is 
the CRC which is also 
used by the Teacher-in-
charge. 3 rooms are 
locked for major repairs. 
Sports room and library 
is locked during school 
hours. Remaining 
classrooms all need 
minor repairs. There is 1 
mid-day meal kitchen. 
Separate toilet for boys 
and girls. The school has 
1 computer that is 
dismantled and kept at 
the Head Master or 
Teacher-in-charge room.  
The author observed an 
open rubbish pit in the 
school compound from 
which stray dogs fed. .   
A dysfunctional SDMC 
selected by the Head Master. 
Meetings are not conducted 
regularly. According to the 
minutes book, only 3 to 5 
members attend the meetings.  
Meeting minutes are not 
recorded at the meetings. In the 
presence of the author, the head 
master wrote the minutes of the 
previous meeting, held two 
weeks ago, and since some of 
the SDMC members were 
present for the author's 
interview, got them to sign it. It 
did not matter if they attended 
that meeting or not. Only 23 
percent of the SDMC members 
are female.  
 9 teachers have been deputed 
to the school. Since the post of 
the Head Master is vacant, the 
senior most teacher becomes 
the Teacher -in-Charge. Only 7 
teacher were seen at the time 
of both visits. Therefore only 
their profile was recorded. 4 of 
the teachers were SCs, 2 were 
BCs and there was 1 ST. 5 of 
the teachers had 11 to 15 years 
of experience and other 2 
teachers had 5 to 7 years of 
experience. 2 of the teachers 
were from other villages in HD 
Kote, another 2 from Mysore 
city and the remaining 3 from 
other districts. During the 
author's visits, some of the 
teachers were observed 
arriving late to school, others 
though present not actively 
engaged in teaching.  
The school has been visited 7 
times by the Cluster 
Resource Person, 2 times by 
the Block Resource Person 
and once by the Block 
Education Officer. It is 
unclear in the interviews 
with SDMC members if they 
had gone for trainings. Some 
did not even know where the 
nearest Cluster Resource 
Center in which SDMC 
trainings are conducted was.  
Co-educational 
Classes I to VII 
Cluster Resource 
Cneter is within the 
school compound 
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Total enrolment is 
113. 40 percent of 
the students are 
SCs, 36 percent 
are BCs and 24 
percent are SCs. 
7 classrooms. There is a 
separate room for the Head 
Master.  4 classrooms are in 
good condition and the other 
2 need minor repairs. 
Drinking water is available 
via a hand pump. One class 
has television. The Head 
Master's office as 3 
computers, a colour printer 
and he himself has a 
personal laptop. A speaker 
system has been installed in 
the school. There are 
seperate toilets for boys and 
girls. There is also 1 mid-
day meal kitchen.   
SDMC was formed 
after consultation 
with the parents of 
school going children 
and members of the 
community. 46 
percent of its 
members are female. 
Meetings are held 
monthly and there are 
at least 6-7 
participants. As seen 
in the minutes book, 
meeting minutes are 
recorded extensively 
and signed the 
participants present.  
5 teachers have been deputed 
to the school. Since the post of 
the Head Master is vacant, the 
senior most teacher becomes 
the teacher -in-charge. He is 
ST. There is also 1 SC teacher, 
2 BCs and 1 GC. 2 of the 
teachers have 18 and 16 years. 
The remaining 3 have between 
7 to 10 years of experience. 4 
of the teachers are from other 
villages within H.D. Kote and 
1 is from Mysore city. At both 
the times of visit, all teachers 
were present. Apart from the 
teacher-in-charge, all other 
teachers were engage actively 
in the classroom.  The teacher-
in-charge had the author wait 
till lunch time to interview the 
other teachers.  
School was visited 8-10 times 
by the Cluster Resource 
Person (the teacher were 
unsure) and 1 time by the 
Block Resource Person. 
Cluster Resource Person 
conducted training for SDMC 
members at the Cluster 
Resource Center. Majority of 
the SDMC members 
interviewed do not recall 
interacting with the CRP on a 
personal basis.  
Co-educational 
Classes I to VII 
5 km away from 
Cluster Resource 
Center 
        
        
        
        
     (Source: Data collected by the Author.) 
